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Introduction 
News reports of childhood sexual abuse by Catholic priests initially 
shocked and subsequently angered the public. Emboldened by the public's 
reaction toward sexual abusers, survivors attempted to confront their 
abusers in civil court. 1 Jurisdictions adjudicated these claims if they were 
brought within two years of reaching the age of majority. 2 Yet, survivors 
often did not recognize the damage done to them until several years after 
they reached the age of majority. And by the time they did, the two-year 
statute of limitations had passed. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
survivors lobbied state legislatures to extend. the time within which they 
could sue their abusers. 3 Almost all state legislatures responded by 
extending the statute of limitations well past the age of majority so that 
survivors had more time to bring their claims. 4 In contrast, few states allow 
survivors of physical and emotional abuse and neglect the same right. 5 
I argue that this legislation should apply to survivors of all forms of 
child abuse. Recent research dispels the mistaken beliefs that underlie the 
justifications for the disparate treatment. Given this, extension of the statute 
of limitations and delayed discovery rule to survivors of all forms of child 
abuse is necessary. Doing so would improve survivors' health and 
productivity. 6 Dependence on welfare, disability, unemployment would 
decrease as a result. Finally, it would send the message that all forms of 
childhood maltreatment are damaging and worthy of recognition. 
1 Elizabeth A. Wilson, Suing for Lost Childhood: Sexual Abuse, the Delayed Discovery 
Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-Survivors of Child Abuse, 12 UCLA 
WOMEN'S L.J. 145, 165 (2003). 
2 See, e.g., Messina v. Bonner, 813 F. Supp. 346,350-51 (1993). 
3 Wilson, supra note 1. 
4 See infra Table 1. 
5 See infra. 
6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Adverse Childhood Experiences Reported by Adults - Five State, 2009, 59 No. 
49 Morbidity and Morality Weekly Report, 1609 (2010) [hereinafter MMW]; Shanta R. 
Dube et al., Assessing the reliability of retrospective reports of adverse childhood 
experiences among HMO members attending a primary care clinic, 28 CHILD ABUSE 
NEGL. 729, 737 (2004) ("Psychological treatment that can mitigate the progression of 
ACE-related health problems, such as trauma-focused cognitive-behavioral therapy, are 
effective and should be widely disseminated."); Robert F. Anda et al., Childhood abuse, 
household dysfUnction, and indicators of impaired adult worker performance, 8 PERM. J. 
30, 38 (2004). 
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I. The Statute of Limitations for Non-Sexual Child Abuse Claims is 
Considerably and Unjustifiably Shorter than the Statute of 
Limitations for Sexual Abuse Claims 
As stated above, sex abuse survivors have lobbied state legislatures 
to extend the time within which they could sue their abusers. 7 Eighty-six 
percent of states did. 8 Most states extended the limitations period some 
years past majority or within some years of discovery of the harm. 9 In 
contrast, few states have done the same for adult survivors of physical and 
emotional abuse and neglect. 10 
Professor Elizabeth A. Wilson 11 identified at least two common 
justifications for the disparity. 12 The first is that sexual abuse is more 
pervasive and damaging than other forms of abuse. 13 The second is that 
sexual abuse survivors repress the memory of their experiences while 
survivors of other forms of child abuse do not. 14 
To use the first justification, one must believe that child abuse 
happens in distinct categories. One must also believe that each category or 
type of abuse causes different and distinct measurable damage. To use the 
second justification, one must believe that repressed memory is common in 
sexual abuse survivors. 
A. Eighty-Six Percent of States have an Extended Statute of Limitations 
for Sex Abuse Claims 
Almost all states 15 have enacted legislation extending the statute 
limitations for sex abuse claims. 16 Almost 70% of these states allow 
survivors between two and eight years to file claims. 17 Just over twenty-five 
7 Wilson, supra note I. 
8 See infra Table 1. 
9 !d. 
10 See infra Table 3. 
11 Professor Elizabeth A. Wilson is a visiting scholar at Rutgers University School of Law. 
She is currently in India completing research on her manuscript, Be the Change: Gandhi 
and the Humans Rights Project. 
12 Wilson, supra note I, at I93-218. 
13 !d. 
14 !d. 
15 I have included the District of Columbia as a "state" in my discussion. 
16 Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington. See infra Table 1. 
17 Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
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percent allow survivors between ten and thirty-five years past majority to 
file claims. 18 Three states set no· statute of limitations for sex abuse 
claims. 19 Seven states do not have an extended statute of limitations for 
sexual abuse claims. 20 
Table 1. Extended Statute of Limitations for Sex Abuse Claims 
Extended Statute of 
With Codified Discovery Rule With Judicial Discovery Rule 
Limitations for Sexual Abuse 
Alaska Stat § 09.10.065 (201 0). 
Alaska Stat§ 09.10.140(8)(1) & 
(2) (2010). 
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-130 Ark. Code Ann.§ 16-56-
(201 0). 130(C)(3) (2010). 
CaL Civ. Proc. Code§ 340.1 CaL Civ. Proc. Code§ 340.l(A) 
(2010). (2010). 
Colo. Rev. Stat§ 13-80-103.7 
Sandoval v. Archdiocese of 
None. Denver, 8 P.3d 598 (Colo. App. 
(2010). 
2009). 
Conn. Gen. Stat § 52-577d 
Conn. Gen. Stat § 52-595 (201 0) 
(2010). 
DeL Code Ann. Tit 10, § 
None. None. 
8145(A)-(8) (20 I 0). 
D.C. Code§ 12-301(11) (2010). D.C. Code§ 12-301(11) (2010). 
Fla. Stat Ann.§ 95.11(9) (2010). Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 95.11(7) (2010). 
Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33.1 
None. None. 
(201 0). 
Haw. Rev. Stat Ann.§ 657-1.8 Haw. Rev. Stat Ann. § 657-
(2012). L8(A)(2) (2012). 
Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1704(1) Idaho Code Ann.§ 6-1704(1) 
(201 0). (2010). 
735 IlL Comp. Stat 5/13-202.2 735 IlL Comp. Stat 5/13-202.2(8) 
(2010). (2010). 
Ind. Code Ann.§ 34-11-2-4 Doe v. Shultz-Lewis, 718 
(8)(1) & (2) (2010). N.E.2d 738 (Ind. 1999). 
Iowa Code § 614.1 (12) (20 I 0). Iowa Code§ 614.8a (2010). 
Kan. Stat Ann. § 60-523 (2009). 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-523(A) 
(2009). 
Ky. Rev. Stat Ann.§ 413.249 Ky. Rev. Stat Ann.§ 413.249(2) 
(2010). (2010). 
La. Revised Statutes, Title. 
None. 
Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So.2d 
2800.9(A) (2010). 206,211 (La. 1994). 
Me. Rev. Stat Ann. Tit 14, § 
None. 
McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d 463 
752-C (2010). (Me. 1994). 
Neb. Rev. Stat Ann. § 25-228 
None. 
Teater v. State of Nebraska, 559 
(2012). N.W.2d 758 (Neb. 1997). 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington. See infra Table 2. 
18 Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia. See infra Table 2. 
19 Delaware, Florida (if sexual abuse experienced under age 16) and Maine. See infra 
Table 2. 
20 Alabama, Arizona, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia. 
See infra Table 1. 
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Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
11.215(1)(A) & (l)(B) (2010). 11.215(l)(B) (2010). 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-
G(I) & (II) (20 I 0). 
G(II) (2010). 
N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2a:61b-l(b)(c) N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2a:61b-l(B) 
(2010). (2010) 
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 37-l-30(A)(I) N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 37-I-30(A)(2) 
& (2) (201 0). (201 0). 
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 213-C (2010). None. None. 
N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-01-25.1 N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-01-25.1 
(2010). (2010). 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
None. Judicial. 
2305.111 (C) (201 0). 
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § 
95(A)(6)(A) & (B) (2010). 95(A)(6)(B) (2010). 
Or. Rev. Stat.§ 12.117 (2010). Or. Rev. Stat.§ 12.117(1)(2010). 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
None. None. 5533(B)(2)(1) (201 0). 
R.I. Gen. Laws§ 9-1-51 (2010). R.I. Gen. Laws§ 9-1-51 (2010). 
S.C. Code Ann.§ 15-3-555(A) S.C. Code Ann.§ 15-3-555(A) 
(2010). (2010). 
S.D. Codified Laws § 26-10-25 S.D. Codified Laws§ 26-10-25 
(2010). (2010). 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 
16.0045 (I), (2) & (3) (20 I 0). 16.0045(C)(20 I 0). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78b-2- Utah Code Ann. § 78b-2-308(2) 
308(2)(A)-(5) (2010). (201 0). 
Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, § 522 Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, § 522(A) 
(2010). (2010). 
Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-243(D) Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-249(6) 
(2010). (2013). 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 
4.16.340 (201 0). 4.16.340(8) & (C) (20 I 0). 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 893.587 
None. Judicial. 
(2010). 
Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ l-3-105(B) 
None. Judicial. (201 0). 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. 
None. None. 
Proc. § 5-117(B) (201 0). 
Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 260, § .4c Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 260, § 4c 
(2014). (2014). 
Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2)(A) Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2)(A) 
(2010). (2010). 
Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 537.046 (2010). Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 537.046 (2010). 
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2- Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-
216(1 )(A) & (I )(B) (20 10). 216(1)(B) (2010). 
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Table 2. Legislatively Extended Statute of Limitations for Child Sex 
Abuse Survivors 
States that allow survivors States that allow survivors States that allow sex abuse claims 
between 2 and 8 years past the between I 0 and 35 years past the to be brought at any time past the 
age of majority to bring claims age of majority to bring claims age of majority 
Alaska Stat. § 09.10.065 (20 l 0). 
735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-202.2 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 8145(A)-
(B) (2010). (B) (2010). 
Ark. Code Ann.§ 16-56-130 Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 260, § 4c 
Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 95.11(9) (2010) 
(201 0). (2014). 
(for sexual abuse experienced under 
the age of 16). 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.1 
Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 537.046 (2010). 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 14, § 752-C 
(2010). (2010). 
Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 13-80-103.7 Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-228 
(2010). (2012). 
D.C. Code§ 12-301(11) (2010). 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
11.215(1 )(A) & (I )(B) (201 0). 
Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 95.11(9) (2010). 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-G(I) 
& (II) (20 I 0). 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
Ga. Code Ann.§ 9-3-33.1 (2010). 
2305.111(C) (2010). 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 657-1.8 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
(2012). 5533(B)(2)(1) (20 I 0). 
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-11-2-4(B)(I) Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-243(D) 
& (2) (20 I 0). (2010). 
Iowa Code§ 614.1(12) (2010). Iowa Code§ 614.8a (2010). 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-523 (2009). 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-523(A) 
(2009). 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 413.249 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 413.249(2) 
(2010). (2010). 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 260, § 4c 
§ 5-117(B)(201 0). (2014). 
Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 260, § 4c Minn. Stat. § 54I.073(2)(A) 
(2014). (2010). 
Minn. Stat. § 541.073(2)(A) 
Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 537.046 (2010). 
(2010). 
Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 537.046 (2010). 
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-
216(1)(B) (2010). 
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2- Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 
216(1)(A) & (I)(B) (2010). 1 1.215( I )(B) (20 1 0). 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-I-30(A)(l) N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-G(II) 
& (2) (20 I 0). (2010). 
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 213-C (2010). 
N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2a:61b-l(B) 
(2010). 
N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-01-25.1 N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 37-I-30(A)(2) 
(2010). (2010). 
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-01-25.1 
95(A)(6)(A) & (B) (2010). (201 0). 
R.I. Gen. Laws§ 9-1-51 (2010). 
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § 
95(A)(6)(B) (2010). 
S.C. Code Ann.§ 15-3-555(A) 
Or .Rev. Stat.§ 12.117 (I) (2010). 
(2010). 
S.D. Codified Laws§ 26-10-25 
R.I. Gen. Laws§ 9-1-51 (2010). 
(2010). 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555(A) 
16.0045(1), (2) & (3) (2010). (2010}. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78b-2- S.D. Codified Laws§ 26-10-25 
308(2)(A)-(5) (201 0). (2010). 
Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, § 522 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 
(2010). 16.0045(C) (201 0). 
' 
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Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.16.340 Utah Code Ann.§ 78b-2-308(2) 
(201 0). (2010). 
Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, § 522(A) 
(2010). 
Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-249(6) 
(2013). 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 4.16.340 
(B), (C) (201 0). 
Approximately 70% of these states added a delayed discovery rule 
to further extend the limitations period. 21 These states allow survivors to 
sue some years after they discovered the injury and the causal connection 
between it and the abuse. 22 Ninety-three percent of these states allow 
survivors to sue between 2 and 10 years after discovery. 23 One state allows 
survivors to sue 20 years after discovery. 24 One allows survivors to sue any 
time after discovery. 25 
Twenty-two percent of states have a judicial delayed discovery rule 
for sex abuse claims. 26 Four states, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland and New 
York, have no statutory or judicial delayed discovery rule for sex abuse 
claims.27 
B. Ninety-One Percent of States Apply Shorter Tort Limitations Rules to 
Child Abuse Claims Other than Sex Abuse 
Most states apply tort law limitations rules to claims for child abuse 
claims other than sex abuse. 28 The difference between the two ranges from 
1-11 years in 65% of states and 18-32 years in 11% of states. 29 The 
difference is incalculable in 15% of states. 30 This occurs when the 
limitations period for both actions is the same, but the delayed discovery 
rule is only applicable to sex abuse claims. 31 Or there is no limitation for 
21 See supra Table 1. 
22 See id. 
23 Alaska, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wyoming. See supra Table 1. 
24 Illinois. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (2014). 
25 Virginia. VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-249(6) (2013). 
26 Colorado, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, 
Wyoming. See supra Table 1. 
27 See supra Table 1. 
28 See infra Table 3. 
29 Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Table 3. 
30 Alaska (for felony sexual assault), Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, Montana, New Jersey 
and Utah. 
31 For example Arkansas. See infra Table 3. 
Summer 2016 De-categorizing Child Abuse 149 
sex abuse claims. 32 In fact, the differences indicated above are actually 
much larger when the delayed discovery rule is factored in. 
There are several states that do not follow the above pattern. Florida 
allows survivors of physical and sexual abuse to file claims within seven 
years of majority or within four years of discovery. 33 Idaho allows survivors 
of physical abuse to file claims within five years of age 18, or within five 
years of discovery. 34 Louisiana allows survivors of physical and sexual 
abuse to file claims within 10 years of majority. 35 Finally, Oregon allows 
survivors of emotional, physical and sexual child abuse to file claims within 
40 years of majority or within five years of discovery. 36 
Table 3. Years Disparity Between Extended Sexual Abuse Statute of 
Limitations and the Statute of Limitations Applicable to Other Child 
Abuse Claims 
Extended Statute of Limitations Statute of Limitations Applicable 
for Sex Abuse Claims to Other Child Abuse Claims 
No statute of limitations for felony 
child sexual abuse. Within three 
years of majority for misdemeanor 
sexual assault and incest or three 
Within 2 years. Alaska Stat. § 
years from discovery. Alaska Stat. 
09.10.070 (2010). 
§ 09.10.065 (2010); Alaska Stat.§ 
09.10.140(b)(l) & (2) (2010). 
Within 3 years of discovery of Within 3 years from age 21. 
childhood sexual abuse. Ark. Code Ark. Code Ann.§ 16-56-l16(a) 
Ann.§ 16-56-130 (2010). (201 0). 
Within 8 years of 18 years old or Within 2 years. Cal. Civ. Proc. 
within 3 years of discovery. Cal. Code§ 335.1 (2010); Cal. Civ. 
Civ. Proc. Code§ 340.1 (2010). Proc. Code§ 352 (2010). 
Within 6 years of 18 years old. 
Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 13-80-103.7 Within 2 years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 
(2010). See also Sandoval v. 13-80-103(l)(C) (2010). 
Archdiocese of Denver, 8 P.3d 598 
(Colo. App. 2009). 
Within 30 years from age of Within 3 years of injury. Conn. 
majority. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52- Gen. Stat.§ 52-584 (2010). 
577d (2010). 
No statute of! imitations. Del. Code Within 2 years. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 
Ann. Tit. 10, § 8145(A)-(B) (2010). 10, § 8119 (2010). 
Intentional torts: within I year of 
Age of majority plus 7 years or 3 
18 years old. Negligence: Within 3 
years from discovery. D.C. Code § 
years of 18 years old. D.C. Code § 
12-301(4) (2010); D.C. Code§ 12-
12-301(11) (2010). 301 (8) (20 I 0); D.C. Code§ 12-
302(A) (20 I 0). 
32 For example Delaware. See Table 3. 
33 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 95.11(7) (2010). 
34 lDAHOCODEANN. § 6-1704(1) (2010). 
35 LA. C!V. CODE ANN., Art. 3496.1 (2014). 
36 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (2013). 
Difference 
Felony Sexual assault: No limit 
versus 2 years. Misdemeanor 
Sexual Assault: Within 3 years of 
majority or discovery (potentially 
limitless time period) versus 2 
years. 
Within three years of discovery 
(potentially limitless period) versus 
3 years from age 21. 
6 years plus. 
4 years plus. 
27 years. 
No limit versus 2 years. 
4-6 years plus. 
~ 
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Within 5 years of age of majority. 
Within 2 years. Ga. Code Ann. § 9-
3-33 (2010); Ga. Code Ann.§ 9-3- 3 years. 
Ga. Code Ann.§ 9-3-33.1 (2010). 
90 (2010). 
Within 8 years of age 18 or 3 years Within 2 years. Haw. Rev. Stat. 
from discovery. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 657-7 (2010); Haw. Rev. 6 years plus. 
Ann.§ 657-1.8 (2012). Stat. Ann. § 657-13 (201 0). 
Within 20 years from age of 
majority or 20 years from Within 2 years. 735 lll. Comp. Stat. 
18 years plus. 
discovery. 735 111. Comp. Stat. 5/13-202 (20 I 0). 
5/13-202.2 (20 I 0). 
Within 7 years of age 18.lnd. Code 
Ann. § 34-11-2-4 (8)(1) & (2) 
Within 2 years. Ind. Code Ann. § 
(2010). Judicial Delayed 
34-11-2-4 (A) (2010). 
5 years plus. 
Discovery. Doe v. Shultz-Lewis, 
718 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. 1999). 
Within 4 years from discovery. 
Within I year of age 18. Iowa Code 
§ 614.1(2) (2010); Iowa Code§ 3 years plus. 
Iowa Code§ 614.8A (2010). 
.614.8 (2010). 
Within 3 years of majority or 3 
Within I year. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 
years from discovery. Kan. Stat. 2 years plus. 
Ann. § 60-523 (2009). 
60-514(b) (2009). 
Within 5 years from date of 
Within I year. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
majority or discovery. Ky. Rev. 
§ 413.140(1)(A) (2010). 
4 years plus. 
Stat. Ann.§ 413.249 (2010). 
Intentional torts: Within 2 years. 
No statute of limitations. Me. Rev. Negligence: within 6 years. Me. 
Stat. Ann. Tit. 14, § 752-C (2010). Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 14, § 752 No limit versus 2 and 6 years. 
(2010); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 14, 
§ 753 (2010); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Tit. 14, § 853 (2010). 
Within 7 years from age of Within 3 years. Md. Code Ann., 
majority. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-IOI(A) 4 years. 
Jud. Proc. § 5-117(8) (20 I 0). (2010). 
Within 35 years or within 3 years Within 3 years. Mass. Ann. Laws 
of discovery. Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. Ch. 260, § 2a (2010); Mich. Comp. 32 years plus. 
260, § 4c (2014). Laws§ 600.5805 (2010). 
Within 6 years of age 18 or within 
Within 1 yearofage 18. Minn. 
Stat. § 541.07 (I )(2009); Minn. 
6 years of discovery. Minn. Stat. § 
Stat.§ 541.15 (2009); Minn. Stat.§ 
5 years plus. 
541.073(2)(A) (20 1 0). 
541.15(A)(l) (2009). 
Intentional torts: within 2 years. 
Within 10 years from age 21 or Negligence: 5 years. 
within 3 years of discovery. Mo. Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 516.140 (2010); 
5-8 years plus. Rev. Stat.§ 537.046 (2010). Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 516.120(4) 
(201 0); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.170 
(201 0). 
Within 3 years of majority or 
Within 3 years; tolled during 
minority but only max 5 years. 
within 3 years from discovery. 
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204 No difference except delayed 
Mont. Code Ann.§ 27-2-216(1)(a) 
(2010); Mont. Code Ann.§ 27-2- discovery applicable to sex abuse 
& (l)(b) (2010). 
401(1) (2010). claims but not to other tort claims. 
Within 4 years of age 21. Neb. Rev. 
Within 12 years of age 21. Neb. 
Stat. Ann.§ 25-207 (2010); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 25-212 (2010); 8 years. 
Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 25-228 (2012). 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 25-213 
(2010). 
Within 10 years of age 18 or within 
Within 4 years of age 18. Nev. Rev. 
I 0 years of discovery. Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 11.215 (1 )(A) & ( 1 )(B) Stat. Ann.§ 11.220 (2010); Nev. 6 years plus. 
(201 0). 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11.250 (20 10). 
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Within 2 years of age of majority. 
Within 12 years from age of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 508:4 
majority or within 3 years of (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 
I 0 years plus. discovery. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:8 (2010). Disability Statute: 
508 :4-G (I) & (II) (20 I 0). N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:8 
(2010). 
Within 2 years from reasonable 
discovery (provision b) plus 
equitable extension available Within 2 years of age 21. N.J. Stat. 
"because of the plaintiffs mental Ann.§ 2A:I4-2 (2010); N.J. Stat. No difference except delayed 
state, duress by the defendant, or Ann.§ 2A:I4-21 (2010). discovery applicable to sex abuse 
any other equitable grounds." claims but not to other tort claims. 
(provision c). N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 
2A:6IB-I(b) (2010); N.J. Stat. 
Ann.§ 2A:6IB-I(c) (2010). 
Within 6 years of age 18 or within Within I year. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
3 years of discovery. N.M. Stat. 
37-1-8 (2010); N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 
5 years plus. 37-1-10 (2010); N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 
Ann.§ 37-I-30(A)(I) & (2) (2010). 
28-6-1. 
Within 3 years of age of majority. 
Within 5 years of age of majority. N.Y.C.P.L.R. 215 (2010); 
2 years. N.Y.C.P.L.R. 213-C (2010). N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214 (2010); 
,. 
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 208 (2010). 
Within 7 years from discovery. Within I yearofage 18. 
N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-01-25.1 N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-01-18 6 years plus. 
(2010). (2010); N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-01-
16(5) (2010); N.D. Cent. Code§ 
28-01-25 (2010). 
Within 12 years from age of Within I year. Ohio Rev. Code 
majority. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § Ann.§ 2305.111(8) (2010); Ohio II years. 
2305.1II(C) (2010). Rev. Code Ann.§ 2305.16 (2010). 
Within 2 years from majority or 
Within I year. Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 
12 § 95(A)(4) & (12) (2010); Okla. within 2 years of discovery. Okla. 
Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § 96 (2010); I year plus. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § 95(A)(6)(A) & 
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § 96(A) (6) (8)(2010). 
(2010); 
Within 12 years of age 18.42 Pa. 
Within 2 years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann.§ 5524(1) & (2) (2010); 42 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533(8)(2)(1) 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
10 years. 
(2010). 
5533(8)(1)(i) & (ii) (2010). 
Within 7 years of the act or within Within 3 years. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-
7 years of discovery. R.I. Gen. 1-14 (2010); R.I. Gen. Laws§ 9-1- 4 years plus. 
Laws§ 9-1-51 (2010). 19 (2010). 
Within 6 years of age 21 (Within 9 Within I year of age 18. S.C. Code 
years of age 18) or within 3 years Ann.§ 15-3-530(5) (2009); S.C. 
8 years plus. 
of discovery. S.C. Code Ann. § 15- Code Ann.§ 15-3-535 (2009); S.C. 
3-555(A) (2010). Code Ann.§ 15-3-40(8) (2009). 
Within I yearofage 18. S.D. 
Within 3 years of the act or within Codified Laws§ 15-2-14(3) 
3 years from discovery. S.D. (20 I 0); S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2- 2 years plus. 
Codified Laws§ 26-10-25 (2010). 15 (2010); S.D. Codified Laws§ 
15-2-22 (2010). 
Within 2 years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & 
Within 5 years of age 18. Tex. Civ. Rem.§ 16.003(A) (2010); Tex. 
Prac. & Rem.§ 16.0045 (1), (2) & Civ. Prac. & Rem.§ 16.00l(A)(I) 3 years. 
(3) (2010). (2010); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.§ 
16.00 I (B) (20 I 0). 
Within 4 years from age 18 or 
within 4 years of discovery. Utah Within 4 years of age 18. No difference except delayed 
Code Ann. § 78B-2-308(2)(a)-(5) Utah Code Ann. § 788-2- discovery applicable to sex abuse 
(2010). 307(3)(201 0). claims but not to other tort claims. 
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Within 6 years or 6 years from Within 3 years. Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 
discovery. Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, § 3 year plus. 
522 (201 0). 
12, § 512 (2010). 
Within 20 years after cause 
Within 2 years. Va. Code Ann.§ 
accrues. Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-
8.01-243(A) (201 0). 
18 years. 
243(0) (201 0). 
Within 3 years from act or within 3 Within 2 years. Wash. Rev. Code 
years of discovery. Wash. Rev. Ann.§ 4.16.100 (2010); Wash. I year plus. 
Code Ann.§ 4.16.340 (2010). Rev. Code Ann.§ 4.16.130 (2010). 
Can bring claims until age 35. Wis. 
Within 3 years. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
Stat. Ann.§ 893.587 (2010). 
893.54(1) (2010); Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 32 years. 
893.57 (2010). 
Intentional Torts: within I year. 
Within 8 years of age 18 or within Negligence: within 4 years. Wyo. 
3 years of discovery. Wyo. Stat. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-1 05(A)(IV)(C) 4-7 years plus. 
Ann.§ l-3-105(B) (2010). (2010); Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 1-3-
I 05(A)(V)(B) (201 0). 
C. The Justifications for a Longer Limitations Period for Sex Abuse 
Claims than for Other Child Abuse Claims are not Supported by Scientific 
Research 
There are three common justifications for extending the limitations 
period for sex abuse survivors. 37 The first is that sex abuse is more 
reprehensible and pervasive than other forms of child abuse. 38 The second 
is that sex abuse causes more harm than other forms of abuse. 39 The third is 
that sex abuse survivors repress the memory of the abuse while survivors of 
other forms of abuse do not. 40 
The first two justifications show the belief that child abuse happens 
in distinct categories. They further perpetuate the belief that different forms 
cause different damage. Finally, they demonstrate the belief that sex abuse 
is more prevalent and damaging than other forms of abuse. The third 
justification shows the belief that survivors of other forms of child abuse 
never repress the memory of it. 
As discussed below in Section II, scientific evidence demonstrates 
the inaccuracy of these beliefs. Thus, the justifications for allowing special 
treatment for sexual abuse claims lack merit. 
II. The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study Reveals the 
Truth About Child Abuse Harm 
In 1990, Kaiser Permanente and the Center for Disease Control 
began a study of. the effect of adverse childhood experiences on adult 
37 Wilson, supra note 1, at 193, 198-200. 
38 !d. 
39 /d. at 203. 
40 /d. 
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health. 41 The study, which is still ongoing, is the Adverse Childhood 
Experiences Study (ACE). 42 Approximately 18,000 participants43 received 
a physical exam and answered an extensive questionnaire on their health 
and social well-being from 1995 to 1997.44 The questionnaire also asked 
about abuse, neglect and household dysfunction. 45 
The questionnaire asked about three sub categories of abuse (verbal, 
physical and sexual), two categories of neglect (emotional and physical), 
and five categories of household dysfunction (mother treated violently, 
household substance abuse, parental separation, divorce, and an 
incarcerated household member). 46 
Each participant was awarded 1 point for every "yes" answer to a 
question about exposure to an adverse childhood experience. 47 The points 
were added to determine the adverse childhood experiences (ACE) score. 48 
Below I discuss the ACE study findings, accuracy, and its replication.-<::· 
Finally, I discuss how the ACE study findings rendered previous child abuse 
research, and law and policy based on it, inaccurate and flawed. 
41 Heather Larkin, Joseph J. Shields & Robert F. Anda, The Health and Social 
Consequences of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Across the Lifespan: An 
Introduction to Prevention and Intervention in the Community, 40 J. PREY. INTERY. 
COMMUNITY 263, 270 (2012); Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse 
and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death, 14 AM. J. PREY. 
MED. 245, 258 (1998). 
42 Participants in the study are continuing to be studied. Larkin, Shields & Anda, supra 
note 41. 
43 Participants were predominately well-educated and middle-class members of Kaiser 
Permanente; 54% of the participants were women and 46% were men. Their mean age 
was 56 years. Robert F. Anda et al., The enduring effects of abuse and related adverse 
experiences in childhood: A convergence of evidence from neurobiology and 
epidemiology, 256 EUR. ARCH. PSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCI. 174-86 (2006); Maxia Dong 
et al., The interrelatedness of multiple forms of childhood abuse, neglect, and household 
dysfunction, 28 CHILD ABUSE NEGL. 771-84 (2004). 
44 Larkin, Shields & Anda, supra note 41; David W. Brown et al., Adverse Childhood 
Experiences and the Risk of Premature Mortality, 37 AM. J. PREY. MED. 389-96 (2009); 
Felitti et al., supra note 41. 
45 !d. 
46 Dong et al., supra note 43; see also Daniel P. Chapman et al., Adverse childhood 
experiences and the risk of depressive disorders in adulthood, 82 J. AFFECT. DISORD. 217-
225 (2004) (noting these categories were identified through a review of the research 
literature and discussions with experienced researchers in the field). 
47 Brown et al., supra note 44. 
48 !d. 
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A. Findings-ACEs are Common, Commonly Co-occur and are Highly 
Interrelated 
The most important findings are those that shattered historical 
beliefs about child abuse. The first was that it is common to have had an 
adverse childhood experience. 49 The second was that these experiences 
commonly co-occur. 50 The third was that they are highly interrelated. 51 
1. Adverse Childhood Experiences are Common 
Two-thirds (66%) of the study's participants had experienced at 
least one ACEY One in ten (10%) had experienced 5 or more ACEs. 53 
These results have been duplicated in other population-based surveys. 54 
The study also quantified the prevalence of adverse childhood 
experiences the results of which are in the Table 4 below. 55 
Table 4. ACE Study - Prevalence of ACE 
Physical abuse 28% 
Substance abuse in household 27% 
Parental separation or divorce 23% 
Sexual abuse 21% 
Mental illness in the household 17% 
Emotional neglect 15% 
Domestic violence 13% 
Psychological abuse 11% 
Physical Neglect 10% 
Incarcerated household member 6% 
Thus, the ACE study found the most prevalent form of child abuse 





54 Harriet L. MacMillan, Prevalence of Child Physical and Sexual Abuse in the 
Community: Results From the Ontario Health Supplement, 278 JAMA 131 (1997); L. 
Bynum et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences Reported by Adults-Five States, 2009, 59 
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1609, 
1609-1613 (20 1 0), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm5949 .pdf. 
55 Anda et al., supra note 43; Dong et al., supra note 43. 
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was physical abuse followed by exposure to substance abuse in the 
household. Notably, sexual abuse is only the fourth most prevalent form of 
child abuse. 
2. ACEs Commonly Co-Occur and are Highly Interrelated 
Another important finding is that ACEs commonly co-occur and are 
highly interrelated. Thus, an abused child will often experience multiple 
forms of abuse. 56 For example, 81% of participants exposed to household 
substance abuse also reported experiencing one other type of adverse 
childhood experience. 57 A majority had experienced two or more. 58 This is 
also true for participants exposed to other ACEs. For example, 95% of 
participants who watched their mothers abused experienced at least one 
other adverse childhood experience. 59 Eighty-two percent experienced 
two. 60 
Ninety-eight percent of participants that experienced emotional 
abuse experienced one other adverse childhood experience. 61 Ninety 
percent experienced two additional adverse childhood experiences. 62 
Eighty-three percent of participants who experienced physical abuse 
experienced one other adverse childhood experience. 63 And seventy-eight 
percent of participants who reported sex abuse did as well. 64 
This data dispels the belief that child abuse happens in distinct 
categories and thus causes distinct types of harm. Since ACEs co-occur and 
are highly interrelated it is impossible to determine what act caused what 
harm. It is also impossible to say that a certain type of abuse causes more 
damage than another. 
B. The ACE Study, Although a Retrospective Study, is Reliable and 
Accurate 
Retrospective studies ask questions about past experiences to study 
their current effects. 65 The ACE study is a retrospective study. ACE study 









65 See id. 
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participants were asked to answer questions about past ACE experiences. 66 
This is because the majority of abuse survivors are not identified in 
childhood. 67 If they were, there would be documentation of the abuse and, 
in turn, the study results of the effect of abuse on adult health would be quite 
credible. Reliance on answers to questions about past experiences can make 
retrospective studies inaccurate. 68 Many factors can influence a 
participant's questionnaire answers. The sensitive nature of the questions, 
the lapse in time between the abuse and the study, and abuse-induced 
memory impairment are just a few. 69 Thus, a participant's answers to the 
same questionnaire given at different times might be different. And if so, 
would the results of the study be reliable? 70 
The ACE researchers had the opportunity to address this question. 
By accident, 658 applicants answered the questionnaire twice. 71 The 
researchers evaluated the agreement between the first and second 
questionnaire responses. 72 They also compared the agreement between 
ACEs reported on the first and second questionnaire. 73 They found "the test-
retest reliability in the responses to questions about adverse childhood 
experiences as well as the resulting ACE score to be good (Fleiss, 1981) 
and moderate to substantial (Landis & Koch, 1977)."74 
The results suggest that "retrospective responses to childhood abuse 
and related forms of serious household dysfunction are generally stable over 
time."75 And these results are "consistent with prior studies that have 
analyzed the reliability of reports of childhood maltreatrnent."76 
C. Replication of the Study in Five States Demonstrated Similar Results 
as the ACE Study Including that Sex Abuse is Less Prevalent than 
Commonly Believed 
The ACE study participants were members of Kaiser Permanente in 
San Diego. Would the results be the same if the participants were randomly 
66 !d. at 774. 
67 Dube, supra note 6, at 732. 
68 !d. at 731. 
69 Jd at 729-37. 
70 !d. at 731. 
71 !d. at 731. 
72 !d. 
73 !d. 
74 !d. at 731. 
75 !d. at 735-36. 
76 !d. 
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selected individuals? In 2009, the CDC did a study to answer this 
question. 77 They called 26,229 adults (approximately 5000 more than the 
ACE study) in five states. 78 They asked them eleven questions about eight 
categories of ACE. 79 The result was that the findings of the Five-States 
study and the ACE study were similar. 80 
Fifty-nine percent of the respondents reported one or more ACE and 
8.7% reported five or more. 81 (The ACE study reported 66% of the 
respondents reported one or more ACE and 10% reported 5 or more. 82) The 
prevalence of ACE in the Five-State Study is in Table 5 below. 83 
Table 5. Five-State Study- Prevalence of ACE 
Substance abuse in household 29.1% 
Parental separation or divorce 26.6% 
Verbal Abuse 25.9% 
Mental Illness in the household 19.4% 
Domestic Violence 16.3% 
Physical Abuse 14.8% 
Sexual Abuse 12.2% 
Incarcerated household member 7.2% 
The similarities in the results are striking. Sixty-six percent of 
participants in the ACE study reported experiencing one or more adverse 
childhood experience. 84 Ten percent of them reported experiencing five or 
77 MMW, supra note 6, at 709. 
78 !d. at 1609-10. The five states were Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, and 
Washington. 
79 !d. at 1609. The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System is operated by state health 
departments in collaboration with CDC. Each month, trained interviewers using a 
standardized questionnaire collect data from nine institutionalized households with 
landline telephones. The 2009 ACE module consisted of 11 questions that yielded eight 
categories of ACEs (i.e. verbal abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, household mental 
illness, household substance abuse, domestic violence, parental separation/divorce, and 
incarcerated family members). The 11 ACE questions were modified from the Kaiser-CDC 
ACE study to conform to fewer question categories and were tested for understanding using 
focus groups. 
80 I d. at 1611. 
81 !d. at 1609-10. 
82 F elitti, supra note 41, at 24 7. 
83 MMW, supra note 6, at 161 0-11. 
84 See supra Table 4. 
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more. 85 Fifty-nine percent of participants in the Five-State Study reported 
experiencing one or more adverse childhood. 86 Approximately 9% ofthem 
reported experiencing five or more. 87 
Five thousand more individuals, about one third more, participated 
in the Five-State Study than the ACE study. 88 A corresponding increase in 
the sex abuse numbers in the larger study was expected. This was not the 
case. Twenty-one percent of the participants reported sex abuse in the ACE 
Study, 89 but only twelve percent reported sex abuse in the Five-State 
Study. 90 This totaled about half the percentage reported by the ACE study. 
Also, both studies indicated that sex abuse is less prevalent than other forms 
of abuse. 91 Thus, sex abuse is less prevalent than commonly believed. 
D. Because the ACE Study has Rendered Past Child Abuse Research 
Unreliable and Inaccurate, Law and Policy Should Change to Reflect the 
New Understanding of the Effects of Child Abuse 
In the past, researchers studied child abuse in distinct categories. 92 
Thus, a researcher might study the damaging effects of sex abuse. Or she 
might study the damaging effects of physical abuse. 
The ACE study demonstrated the narrowness of this approach. 93 It 
showed that the long-term effects of child abuse are not necessarily the 
result of a single type of abuse. 94 They are more likely due to many adverse 
childhood experiences. 95 
Single-category child abuse research does not include the effects of 
85 See supra Table 4. 
86 See supra Table 5. 
87 See supra Table 5. 
88 See Dube, supra note 6. 
89 See supra Table 4 
90 See supra Table 5. 
91 See supra Tables 4 & 5. 
92 Dong et al., supra note 43; Valerie J. Edwards et al., Relationship between multiple 
forms of childhood maltreatment and adult mental health in community respondents: 
results from the adverse childhood experiences study, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1453, 1459 
(2003). 
93 The ACE study authors suggest that adverse childhood experiences should be viewed 
as a "complex set of highly interrelated experiences that may include childhood abuse or 
neglect, parental alcohol and drug abuse, domestic violence, parental marital discord, and 
crime in the home." See Dong et al., supra note 43 (citations omitted) 
94 See Dong et al., supra note 43; Edwards et al., supra note 92; Anda et al., supra note 
43, at 181. 
95 See Dong et al., supra note 43. 
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co-occurring adverse childhood experiences. 96 Because of this, such 
research incorrectly attributes all the harm discovered to the category of 
abuse studied. 97 It is more likely, though, that many adverse childhood 
experiences caused the harm. 98 Thus, single-category child abuse research 
is unreliable and inaccurate. 99 
Clearly, the law is out of step with the research. Given the above, it 
is impossible to identify which - or if just one - adverse childhood 
experience caused the damage. Current law allows sex abuse survivors to 
recover for harm caused to them. But it is likely they are recovering for 
damage caused by the sex abuse and other forms of child abuse. Thus, adult 
survivors of all forms of abuse should have the same access as survivors of 
sex abuse to an extended statute of limitations and legislated delayed 
discovery rule. I address the most common challenges against this argument 
below 
III. The Arguments Against Extending the Statute of Limitations to 
Survivors of Other Forms of Child Abuse are Invalid 
There are three main arguments against extending the statute of 
limitations to survivors of other forms of child abuse. The first is such 
legislation will "flood" the courts with lawsuits. The second is child abuse 
is too difficult to define so that defendants know what behavior is actionable 
and courts can draw appropriate lines. The third is therapists will suggest to 
patients that they "recovered" the memory of abuse when none actually 
occurred. This in tum will cause a repeat of history: the wrongful accusation 
of parents, teachers, coaches and priests. 
A. A Flood of Litigation Will Occur if We Extend the Statute of 
Limitations to Survivors of all Forms of Child Abuse. 100 
I am arguing to establish a new right: that survivors of all forms of 
child abuse be given a longer period after majority to sue for damage. 
96 /d. 
97 Dong eta!., supra note 43, at 772; Anda eta!., supra note 43; Felitti eta!., supra note 
41. 
98 /d. 
99 Dong eta!., supra note 43 at 772; Edwards eta!., supra note 92, at 1459; Robert Anda, 
The health and social impact of growing up with adverse childhood experiences: The 
human and economic costs of the status quo, in CONFERENCE fN ANACORTES, W A ON JUNE 
8 (2007). 
100 Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in 
Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REV. 59, 73 (2001). 
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Opponents of the right I propose might argue that such a right "will inundate 
the court with lawsuits." 101 Specifically, ifwe allow survivors of all forms 
of child abuse to use the extended statute oflimitations currently applicable 
to sex abuse survivors, a flood of similar claims will overwhelm the courts. · 
In section one below, I discuss the flaws in this argument. In section two, I 
analyze the case history that evolved from such an extension to see if a flood 
occurred. 
1. The "Floodgates" Argument is a Flawed Argument 
First, the use of this argument demonstrates the judiciary's desire to 
limit its workload 102 and decide claims based on number instead of merit. 103 
Thus, a court that uses such an argument fails to uphold its sworn duty to 
provide an unbiased and impartial place to adjudicate valid claims on their 
merits. 104 
Second, Article III of the US constitution delineates what cases or 
controversies the court must hear. 105 But it does not limit the number. 106 
Furthermore, there is no language in Article III that says ,if allowing a 
certain case to be heard would open the door to too many other such cases, 
it need not be heard. 107 
The same is true when state courts use the argument. State 
constitutions are modeled on the US constitution. They all establish the 
same three branches of government. Each establishes the jurisdiction of the 
courts in the judicial branch. For example, Article 6, section 10 of the CA 
constitution, after delineating the jurisdiQtion of the supreme and appellate 
courts, states, "Superior courts have original jurisdiction in all other 
causes." 108 Like Article III, the section does not limit the number. 
Consequently, state courts violate the separation of powers doctrine when 
they invoke the "floodgates" argument. 
Thus, when courts use the "floodgates" argument they 
"impermissibly usurp the jurisdictional powers reserved solely to the 
101 !d.; Toby J. Stem, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the "Floodgates of 
Litigation," 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 381, 386 (2003). 
102 Stem, supra note 101, at 386-88. 
103 !d. at 399, 406, 408. 
104 See id. 
105 U.S. CONST. art. III,§§ 1-2. 
106 Stem, supra note 101, at 397. 
107 !d. 
108 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10. 
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legislature" violating the separation of powers doctrine. 109 The proper body 
to consider judiciary caseload is the legislature. 11° For example, Congress 
has the power to limit federal court caseload by raising court filing fees and 
amount in controversy limits. 111 When courts use the argument, without 
explicit statutory mandate, they imply legislative intent to limit the court's 
caseload that the legislature may not have had. 112 
Third, the argument does not specify what constitutes a "flood" of 
claims. 113 A "flood" to one judge might not be one to the next. Thus, one 
judge might allow the new right. Another might not. What results is 
inconsistent precedent. 114 
The final flaw is related to the third. No factual support accompanies 
the argument. 115 On the contrary, in the cases where the right is established 
despite the "floodgates" argument, the flood does not occur. 116 This is likely 
to be the case should the right I propose be established. Studies show that 
adult survivors of child abuse, when questioned about the abuse they 
experienced as children, tend to under report the abuse. 117 Thus, many 
survivors of childhood maltreatment will not bring actions against their 
perpetrators because they will have mentally minimized the harm they 
experienced. 118 
2. An Examination o(Oregon 's Case History-Did the Flood Occur? 
Several states already allow survivors of multiple forms of child 
abuse to recover without apparent ill effect on the court system. Idaho and 
Louisiana have an extended statute of limitations for physical abuse 
claims. 119 Florida and Oregon both extend the statute of limitations for 
survivors of all forms of childhood maltreatment. 120 Oregon has the most 
109 Id.; Stem, supra note 101, at 379, 397-400. 
110 Stem, supra note 101, at 399-400. 
Ill Id. 
112 Id. at 400-01. 




117 Donna Femina Della, et al., Child abuse: adolescent records vs. adult recall, 14 CHILD 
ABUSE NEGL. 227, 229-30 (1989); Linda Meyer Williams, Recall of childhood trauma: a 
prospective study of women's memories of child sexual abuse., 62 J. CONSULT. CLIN. 
PSYCHOL. 1167 (1994); Dube et al., supra note 6, at 729. 
118 Id. 
119 IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-1704(1) (2007); LA. REV. STAT., Tit. 2800.9(A) (2010). 
12° FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 95.11(7) (2010); OR. REV. STAT.§ 12.117 (2013). 
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liberal statute of all the states, allowing adult survivors of all forms of child 
abuse to bring claims until the age of 40 or five years from discovery, 
whichever is longer. 121 Thus, if such legislation will cause a flood it is most 
likely to occur in Oregon, the state with the most liberal legislation. 
Below, I examine the evolution of the Oregon legislation and the 
ambiguous language within it that might prompt practitioners to bring more 
cases than they might otherwise. I also review the case law interpreting the 
statute from its enactment to the present to determine if a flood actually 
occurred. Finally, I review the statutory language that limited the "flood" 
by making the statute inapplicable against municipalities. 
Oregon first enacted the Oregon Revised Statute ("ORS") § 12.117 
in 1989. It allowed adult survivors to bring claims based on child abuse "or 
conduct knowingly allowing, permitting, or encouraging child abuse" 
within 5 years of age 18. 122 The statute defined child abuse as: 
(a) Intentional conduct by an adult that results in: 
(A) any physical injury to a child; or 
(B) any mental injury to a child which results in observable 
and substantial impairment of the child's mental or 
psychological ability to function caused by cruelty to the 
child, with due regard to the culture of the child; 
(b) Sexual abuse of a child including but not limited to rape, 
sodomy, sexual abuse, sexual penetration with a foreign 
object and incest, as those acts are defined in ORS chapter 
163; or 
(c) Sexual exploitation of a child, including but not limited 
to: 
(A) Conduct constituting violation ofORS 163.435.and any 
other conduct which allows, employs, authorizes, permits, 
induces or encourages a child to engage in the performing 
for people to observe or the photographing, filming, tape 
recording or other exhibition which, in whole or in part, 
depicts sexual conduct or contact; and 
(B) Allowing, permitting, encouraging or hiring a child to 
engage in prostitution, as defmed in ORS chapter 167. 123 
121 OR. REv. STAT.§ 12.117 (2013). 
122 OR. REv. STAT. § 12.117 (1989). 
123 !d. 
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This provision, ORS § 12.117, has been amended many times since 
its enactment. The most significant amendment was made in 2009. 124 Prior 
to 2009, survivors had six years past the age of majority or three years from 
discovery, whichever was longer, to bring their claims, but in no event could 
they bring an action after the age of 40. 125 The language of the statute was 
amended in 2009 to allow survivors until age of 40 or five years past 
discovery whichever is longer to bring their claims. 126 This expansion 
recognizes the time it takes for a person to understand the long-term 
detrimental effects of childhood maltreatment. 
The statute defines child abuse as intentional conduct by an adult 
which results in: "(A) any physical injury to a child; or (B) Any mental 
injury to a child which results in observable and substantial impairment of 
the child's mental or psychological ability to function caused by cruelty to 
the child, with due regard to the culture of the child." 127 ,_ 
None of the versions of the statute define physical and mental injury. 
While physical injury is fairly easy for courts to determine, the lack of 
definition of "mental injury" and the breadth of what this might entail is the 
kind of language that would be ripe for exploitation and in tum might 
arguably result in a "flood of cases." In addition, the "any mental injury to 
124 The statute was amended in 1991, 1993, 2009, and 2011. 
125 OR. REV. STAT.§ 12.117(1) (1993) ("1) Notwithstanding ORS 12.110, 12.115 or 
12.160, an action based on conduct that constitutes child abuse or conduct knowingly 
allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse accruing while the person who is entitled 
to bring the action is under 18 years of age shall be commenced not more than six years 
after that person attains 18 years of age, or if the injured person has not discovered the 
injury or the causal connection between the injury and the child abuse, nor in the exercise 
of reasonable care should have discovered the injury or the causal connection between the 
injury and the child abuse, not more than three years from the date the injured person 
discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the injury or the 
causal connection between the child abuse and the injury, whichever period is longer. 
However, in no event may an action based on conduct that constitutes child abuse or 
conduct knowingly allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse accruing while the 
person who is entitled to bring the action is within 18 years of age be commenced after that 
person attains 40 years of age." (emphases added)). 
126 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1) (2013) ("(I) Notwithstanding ORS 12.110, 12.115 or 
12.160, an action based on conduct that constitutes child abuse or conduct knowingly 
allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse that occurs while the person is under 18 
years of age must be commenced before the person attains 40 years of age, or if the person 
has not discovered the causal connection between the injury and the child abuse, nor in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the causal connection between the 
injury and the child abuse, not more than jive years from the date the person discovers or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the causal connection between 
the child abuse and the injury, whichever period is longer." (emphases added)). 
127 OR. REV. STAT.§ 12.117 (2)(a) (2013). 
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a child which results in observable and substantial impairment" language is 
so ambiguous that it could also result in decisions that lack a clear pattern. 
This arguably makes it difficult for practitioners to predict the likelihood of 
success when evaluating potential cases. In such situations, practitioners 
may bring more cases than they might otherwise. 
Despite the ambiguity in the statute, no flood occurred. Oregon state 
courts have heard only 23 cases in the 26 years since the statute was enacted, 
and only one case alleging child abuse other than sexual abuse. 128 
Forty-two cases have cited the statute since its enactment in 1989. 129 
Seventeen of these were state appellate cases. 130 Twelve of these interpreted 
128 Sipes v. Sipes, I47 Or. App. 462 (I997). 
129 Doe ISO v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 469 Fed. Appx. 641 (9th Cir. 20I2); 
Bonneau v. Centennial School Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 20I2); V.T. v. City of 
Medford, Or. et al., Slip Copy, Case No. I:09-cv-03007, 2015 WL 300270 (D. Or. 20I5); 
Prasnikar v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church of Lake Oswego, Or., Slip Copy No. 3:I3-cv-
00258-PK, 20I4 WL 7499377 (D. Or. 20I4); Watkins v. Archdiocese of Portland in 
Oregon, 20I2 WL 5844699 (D. Or. 20I2); Snegirev v. Mark, 2012 WL 566592 (D. Or. 
2012); Wand v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 2010 WL 5678689 
(D. Or. 2010); Sapp v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 2008 WL 
I8499I5 (D. Or. 2008); B.J.G. v. Society of the Holy Child Jesus, 2008 WL 89606I (D. 
Or. 2008); John Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 2008 WL 65602I (D. Or. 
2008); Duncan v. Oregon, 2007 WL 789433 (D. Or. 2007); Halseth v. Deines, 2004 WL 
19I9994 (D. Or. 2004); Simone v. Manning, 930 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Or. 1996); In re Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 2006 WL 2038642 (D. Or. 2006); In re Roman 
Catholic Archbishop Of Portland, Or., 335 B.R. 815 (D. Or. 2005); Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Portland, Or. v. Tort Claimants Committee, 2005 WL 1429945 (D. Or. 
2005); In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 54, 
Bankr. L. Rep. P 80,225 (D. Or. 2005) (not reported); Doe I v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 
353 Or. 321, 297 P.3d 1287 (2013); Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey, 347 Or. 389, 223 P.3d 
399 (2009); Lourim v. Swensen, 328 Or. 380 (1999); Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or. 367 
(I999); Owens v. Maass., 323 Or. 330 (1996); A.K.H. v. R.T.C, 3I2 Or. 497 (1992); State 
v. Pinard, 255 Or. App. 4I7, 300 P.3d I77 (2013); Jack Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego School 
Dist., 242 Or. App. 605, 259 P.3d 27, 270 Ed. Law Rep. 855 (20I1); Schmidt v. 
Archdiocese of Portland, Or., 235 Or. App. 516, 234 P.3d 990' (2010); Schmidt v. 
Archdiocese, 2I8 Or. App. 661 (2007); T.R. v. Boy Scouts of America, 205 Or. App. I35 
(2006); State ex rei Department of Human Services v. Shugars, 202 Or. App. 302 (2005); 
Jasmin v. Ross, I77 Or. App. 2IO (2001); Matter of Adoption of Welshans, I 50 Or. App. 
498 (I997); Walthers v. Gossett, I48 Or. App. 548 (I997); Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or. 
App. 425 (1997); Sipes v. Sipes 147 Or. App. 462 (1997); Fearingv. Bucher, 147 Or. App. 
446, 936 P.2d 1023 (1997), Flaningam v. Flaningam, I45 Or. App. 432, 929 P.2d 1084 
(1996); Cooksey Guardian v. Portland Public School, 143 Or. App. 527 (1996); State v. 
Rudder, 137 Or. App. 43 (1996); P.H. v. F.C., 127 Or. App. 592 (1994); Wimber v. Timpe, 
109 Or. App. 139 (1991); S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d I (Texas I996). 
130 State v. Pinard, 255 Or. App. 4I7, 300 P.3d I77 (2013); Jack Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego 
School Dist., 242 Or. App. 605, 259 P.3d 27, 270 Ed. Law Rep. 855 (2011 ); Schmidt v. 
Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 235 Or. App. 5I6, 234 P.3d 990 (2010); Schmidt v. 
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the language of the statute as it pertained to abuse claims. 131 Eleven of these 
were sex abuse claims. 132 Only one was a claim for general child abuse other 
than sex abuse. 133 As for the five remaining cases, three cases cited the 
statute in a footnote in reference to other issues not related to child abuse 134 
Archdiocese, 218 Or.App. 661 (2007); TR v. Boy Scouts of America, 205 Or. App. 135 
(2006); State ex rei Department of Human Services v. Shugars, 202 Or. App. 302 (2005); 
Jasmin v. Ross, 177 Or. App. 210 (2001); Matter of Adoption of Welshans, 150 Or. App. 
498 (1997); Walthers v. Gossett, 148 Or. App. 548 (1997); Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or. 
App. 425 (1997); Sipes v. Sipes, 147 Or. App 462 (1997); Fearing v. Bucher, 147 Or. App. 
446, 936 P.2d 1023 (1997); Flaningam v. Flaningam, 145 Or. App. 432, 929 P.2d 1084 
(1996); Cooksey Guardian v. Portland Public School, 143 Or. App. 527 (1996); State v. 
Rudder, 137 Or. App. 43 (1996); P.H. v. F.C., 127 Or. App. 592 (1994); Wimber v. Timpe, 
109 Or. App. 139 (1991). One case was heard twice by the appellate court. Schmidt v. 
Archdiocese, 218 Or. App. 661 (2007). The first appeal affirmed the trial court's granting ., 
of the Archdiocese's motion for summary judgment which alleged plaintiff failed to state ' 
a claim for sex abuse. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in Schmidt v. Mt. Angel 
Abbey, 347 Or. 389 (2009). On remand, the appellate court, held that there was a factual 
issue as to whether acts that were within priest's employment resulted in abuse of the 
student so as to provide a basis for imposing vicarious liability on priest's employer, which 
precluded summary judgment. Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 235 Or. 
App. 516,234 P.3d 990 (2010). 
131 Jack Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 242 Or. App. 605,259 P.3d 27,270 Ed. Law 
Rep. 855 (2011); Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 235 Or. App. 516,234 
P.3d 990 (2010); Schmidt v. Archdiocese, 218 Or. App. 661 (2007); T.R. v. Boy Scouts of 
America, 205 Or. App. 135 (2006); Jasmin v. Ross, 177 Or. App. 210 (2001); Walthers v. 
Gossett, 148 Or. App. 548 (1997); Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or. App. 425 (1997); Sipes v. 
Sipes, 147 Or. App. 462 (1997); Fearing v. Bucher, 147 Or. App. 446, 936 P.2d 1023 
(1997); Flaningam v. Flaningam, 145 Or. App. 432, 929 P.2d 1084 (1996); Cooksey 
Guardian v. Portland Public School, 143 Or. App. 527 (1996); P.H. v. F.C., 127 Or. App. 
592 (1994). 
132 Jack Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 242 Or. App. 605, 259 P.3d 27, 270 Ed. Law 
Rep. 855 (2011); Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 235 Or. App. 516, 234 
P.3d 990 (2010); Schmidt v. Archdiocese, 218 Or. App. 661 (2007); T.R. v. Boy Scouts of 
America, 205 Or. App. 135 (2006); Jasmin v. Ross, 177 Or. App. 210 (2001); Walthers v. 
Gossett, 148 Or. App. 548 (1997); Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or. App. 425 (1997); Fearing 
v. Bucher, 147 Or. App. 446, 936 P.2d I 023 (1997); Flaningam v. Flaningam, 145 Or. App. 
432, 929 P .2d 1084 (1996); Cooksey Guardian v. Portland Public School, 143 Or. App. 
527 (1996); P.H. v. F.C., 127 Or. App. 592 (1994). 
133 Sipes, 147 Or. App. at 466. 
134 1n State ex rei Department of Human Services v. Shugars, 202 Or. App. 302 (2005), 
the appellant sought to overturn a grant of dependency jurisdiction under O.R.S § 
419B.100(l)(c) for emotionally abusing a child. The court mentions O.R.S. § 12.117 in a 
footnote stating that O.R.S § 419B.100(1)(a)(B)'s definition of child abuse for purposes of 
abuse reporting obligations is substantially similar to the definition in O.R.S. § 12.117. In 
State v. Rudder, 137 Or. App. 43 (1996), the court cited A.K.H. v. R.T.C, 312 Or. 497 
(1992), which discussed the constitutionality of the retroactive provision in O.R.S § 12.117. 
However it noted that in State v. Rudder the legislature's attempt to validate actions taken 
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and two others discussed the statute as an aside to the main issue. 135 Thus, 
the total burden on the state appellate courts in Oregon from cases brought 
under the statute in 26 years was twelve, or approximately 0.5 cases a year 
. or, alternatively, one case every two years. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has heard six cases. 136 Four of them 
interpreted the statute. 137 One held that the statute was to be applied 
retroactively. 138 Another overturned two appellate cases that had ruled 
plaintiff failed to state a claim because plaintiff had alleged facts stating a 
claim for vicarious liability based on respondeat superior. 139 A third case 
in misdemeanor cases by district courts without jurisdiction by passing an amendment 
violated the separation of powers doctrine. In Wimber v. Timpe, 109 Or.App. 139 (1991), 
a child, who was sexually abuse by his adoptive father, moved to vacate the adoption under 
O.R.S. § 109.391 after the 1 year limitation had past. The child argued that the time 
limitation in O.R.S. § 109.381 was tolled by his minority under O.R.S. § 12.160 and 12.117 
both of which extend the statute oflimitations past the age of majority by a set number of 
years for different claims. In a footnote, the court noted that they would not consider the 
O.R.S. § 12.117 argument because the argument was not raised at the trial court level. 
135 In State v. Pinard, 255 Or. App. 417, 300 P.3d 177 (2013), appellant, who was 
convicted of animal abuse, argued that the trial court should have merged guilty verdicts 
of count I and 4 because the statutes governing each included the same elements. One 
made it a crime to "[c]ruelly cause [ ] the death of an animal" (OR. REv. STAT. § 
167.320(1)(b)) and the other made it a crime to "[m]aliciously kill []an animal" (OR. REv. 
STAT. § 167.322(l)(a)). The court then cited resources defining "cruelly," including OR. 
REv. STAT.§ 12.117. In Matter of Adoption of Welshans, 150 Or.App. 498 (1997), the 
Attorney General cited A.K.H. v. R.T.C, 312 Or. 497 (1992), which discussed the 
constitutionality of the retroactive provision in O.R.S § 12.117, to support its argument that 
the time limit to set aside an adoption in O.R.S. § 109.381 (3) does not violate the separation 
of powers doctrine because it operates as a statute oflimitations. 
136 Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 353 Or. 321, 297 P.3d 1287 (2013); Schmidt v. 
Mt. Angel Abbey, 347 Or. 389; 223 P.3d 399 (2009); Lourim v. Swensen, 328 Or. 380, 
977 P.2d 1157 (1999); Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or. 367, 977 P.2d 1163 (1999); Owens v. 
Maass, 323 Or. 439, 918 P.2d 808 (1996); A.K.H. v. R.C.T., 312 Or. 497, 822 P.2d 135 
(1991). 
137 Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey, 347 Or. 389; 223 P.3d 399 (2009); Lourim v. Swensen, 
328 Or. 380, 977 P.2d 1157 (1999); Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or. 367, 977 P.2d 1163 (1999); 
A.K.H. v. R.C.T., 312 Or. 497, 822 P.2d 135 (1991). 
138 A.K.H. v. R.C.T., 312 Or. 497,822 P.2d 135 (1991). This case was a certified question 
from the district court on whether O.R.S. § 12.117 should be applied retroactively. After 
the supreme court certified the question, the legislature amended the statute to clearly state 
that the act applies to all claims filed after October 3, 1989 including any action that would 
have been barred by application of any other period oflimitations prior to October 3, 1989. 
The Supreme Court, citing the 1991 amendment by the legislature, answered the district 
court's question affirmatively. 
139 Lourim v. Swensen, 328 Or. 380, 977 P.2d 1157 (1999). The plaintiffbrought a claim 
against the Boy Scouts of America under the doctrine of respondeat superior for sexual 
assault 30 years prior. The trial court dismissed the action. The appellate court affirmed. 
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defined "cruelty" and "sexual exploitation" as used in the statute and found 
that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a claim based on these 
definitions. 140 
In each of the remaining two cases, one of the parties cited ORS § 
12.117 as an argument that the court dismissed. 141 In Doe 1 v. Lake Oswego 
School Dist., 142 plaintiff sued for sex abuse by a teacher under the Oregon 
Tort Claims Act. The defense compared ORS § 12.117 to the Oregon Tort 
Claims Act, arguing that because the former contained a delayed discovery 
rule and the latter did not, the legislature intended to legislate the discovery 
rule for sex abuse, but not against public entitles, which the Tort Act 
govems. 143 Thus, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs claim under the 
The Supreme Court reversed stating that plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to state a 
claim against the Boy Scouts for vicarious liability under respondeat superior. The ,. 
Supreme Court said the plaintiffs negligence claim alleged "knowingly allowing, , 
permitting or encouraging child abuse" by the Boy Scouts and was sufficient to withstand ·, 
a motion to dismiss. Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or. 367,977 P.2d 1163 (1999). A parishioner 
sued a priest and the archdiocese for sex abuse when he was a minor. The archdiocese 
argued 1) that plaintiff failed to state a claim alleging facts demonstrating that the priest's 
actions were within the scope of employment and 2) plaintiff was not entitled to use the 
extended statute of limitations because the priest's actions on which vicarious liability was 
based were not themselves alleged to have caused harm and are therefore are not acts of 
"child abuse" under the code and thus plaintiffs claim was barred because the statute of 
limitations had run. The circuit (trial) court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. 
Parishioner appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded stating that "[a] jury 
reasonably could infer that Bucher's performance of his pastoral duties with respect to 
plaintiff and his family were a necessary precursor to the sexual abuse and that the assaults 
thus were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that was within the scope 
of Bucher's employment" and the plain wording of the statute allows for an extended 
limitations period for "actions based on conduct that constitutes child abuse." !d. at 377. 
140 Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey, 347 Or. 389; 223 P.3d 399 (2009), concerned the proper 
interpretation of the terms "sexual exploitation" and "cruelty" as used in O.R.S. § 12.117. 
The court ruled that a person has engaged in cruelty to a child for purposes of the statute 
that extends the applicable statute of limitations when a person engages in conduct with 
the specific intent to injure or harm a child and the conduct is capable of producing those 
results and that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the priest's conduct 
constituted cruelty to a child within the meaning of the statute. The court further held that 
conduct qualifies as sexual exploitation of the child under the statute if an individual uses 
a child in a sexual way for his own gratification or benefit and the child is personally 
involved and held there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the priest's 
conduct constituted sexual exploitation within the meaning of the statute making summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
141 Doe I v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 353 Or. 321, 297 P.3d 1287 (2013); Owens v. 
Maass, 323 Or. 430, 918 P.2d 808 (1996). 
142 353 Or. 321, 297 P.3d 1287 (2013). 
143 Doe 1, 353 Or. at 324. Plaintiff, an adult, sued the school district, a municipality, for 
vicarious liability for sexual abuse by a teacher. The Oregon Tort Claims Act applies when 
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Tort Act was barred. The Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the defense's 
argument and held that its reasoning did not prove the legislature intended 
to deprive those suing public entities the use of the delayed discovery 
rule. 144 In Owens v. Maass, petitioner sought post-conviction relief that was 
time barred by the statute of limitations. 145 He argued the legislature 
intended that the extended period in the more recent amendment of ORS § 
12.117 applied retroactively to his petition. 146 The court disagreed. It found 
that there was no express intention in the amended statute that it apply 
retroactively. 147 Thus, in 26 years, the Oregon Supreme court has heard only 
4 cases that were based on claims under the statute. This amounts to 1 case 
every 6.5 years, which hardly amounts to a flood. 
The statute has made an infrequent presence in the federal courts as 
well. The combined federal courts have heard 14 cases jn 26 years. This is 
1.58 cases per year including the lower trial court numbers. None of these 
cases alleged child abuse other than sexual abuse. 
Only twelve federal district court cases have cited ORS § 12.117 
since its enactment in 1989. 148 Two cases covered the applicability of ORS 
a claim is brought against a municipality. It requires plaintiff to notify the municipality 
within 270 days of the alleged injury of the claim and bring the action "within two years 
of the alleged loss or injury." OR. REv. STAT. § 30.275(2). The defendant argued that 
because the legislature wrote the delayed discovery rule in O.R.S. § 12.117 and not in the 
Oregon Tort Claims Act they intended to communicate the legislative policy that the 
discovery rule was inapplicable. The court disagreed. Holding that the judicial discovery 
rule applied to the Oregon Tort Claims Act it stated "that the legislature saw fit to grant 
individuals subjected to 'child abuse' by private actors at least five years from the date of 
discovery of the causal connection between the injury and the abuse to bring their claims 
does not indicate a legislative intent to deprive others subjected to battery by public actors 
of a two-year period from the date they discover their injuries to commence their actions. 
O.R.S. 12.117 does not render the discovery rule inapplicable to plaintiffs' claims." Doe 
1, 353 Or. at 336. 
144 ld. 
145 Owens v. Maass, 323 Or. 430,918 P.2d 808 (1996). In Owens, the petitioner contended 
that the two-year filing period contained in O.R.S. § 138.51 0(2) (1993), rather than the 
120--day filing period contained in O.R.S. § 138.510(2) (1991), should apply to his petition 
for post-conviction relief, because he did not file his petition until after the effective date 
of the new, two-year filing period. The petitioner cited O.R.S. § 12.117 as an example of 
the legislature expressly reviving claims that were previously time barred. The court found, 
however, there was no express intention in the 1993 statute granting post-conviction relief 
and thus the petitioner's petition was time barred. 
146 !d. 
147 !d. 
148 V.T, No. 1:09-cv-03007, slip op., 2015 WL 300270 (D. Or. 2015); Prasnikar v. Our 
Savior's Lutheran Church of Lake Oswego, No. 3:13-cv-00258-PK, 2015 WL 94569 (D. 
Or. 2015); Sapp v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop ofPortland, Or., 2008 WL 1849915 
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§ 12.117' s statute of limitations to federal civil rights claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and claims against municipalities under the Oregon Tort 
Claims Act. Neither found the statute oflimitations applicable. 149 One case 
found plaintiffs claim was time barred under ORS § 12.117. 150 Another 
case found that plaintiff failed to state a claim that defendant "knowingly, 
allowed, permitted, or encouraged" child abuse under ORS § 12.117. 151 One 
case granted and another denied defendant's motion for summary judgment 
alleging that plaintiff failed to timely file her claim. 152 One case held that 
the negligence and breach of fiduciary claims asserted against plaintiff 
stemmed from the original intentional sexual abuse of a child as defined in 
ORS § 12.117, and thus no coverage was owed under plaintiffs umbrella 
insurance policy. 153 Of the unreported cases, three involved sex abuse 
claims and one involved a child abuse claim brought by a prose plaintiff 
against a municipality. The federal court dismissed all of the foregoing , 
claims. 
•' 
A mere two circuit cases have cited ORS § 12.117; only one 
reported. 154 It held that the statute of limitations in ORS § 12.117 does not 
apply to federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 155 The 
unreported case affirmed a district court ruling that plaintiffs claims were 
brought past the bankruptcy claims bar date and past the Oregon statute of 
limitations date. 156 Thus, in 26 years, the total burden on the federal circuit 
court from cases brought under the statute was two, or one case every 13 
years. 
Part of the reason there has been no "flood," despite the rather liberal 
and ambiguous language of the statute, is that ORS § 12.117 only applies to 
private actions. The federal courts have decided that the regular (non-
(D. Or. 2008); B.J.G. v. Society of the Holy Child Jesus, 2008 WL 896061 (D. Or. 2008); 
John Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland, Or., 2008 WL 656021 (D. Or. 2008); Duncan, 
2007 WL 789433 (D. Or. 2007); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co v. Wolf, 2005 WL 3071583 
(D. Or. 2005); Simone v. Manning, 930 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Or. 1996); Watkins v. 
Archdiocese of Portland, Or., 2012 WL 5844699 (D. Or. 2012); Snegirev v. Mark, 2012 
WL 566592 (D. Or. 2012); Wand v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, Or., 2010 
WL 5678689 (D. Or. 2010); Halseth v. Deines, 2004 WL 1919994 (D. Or. 2004). 
149 V.T., 2015 WL 300270; Duncan, 2007 WL 789433. 
150 Prasnikar, 2014 WL 7499377. 
151 Sapp, 2008 WL 1849915. 
152 See B.J.G., 2008 WL 896061, and Simone, 930 F. Supp. 1434. 
153 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co v. Wolf, 2005 WL 3071583 (D. Or. 2005). 
154 Bonneau v. Centennial School Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2012); Doe 150 v. 
Archdiocese of Portland, Or., 469 Fed.Appx. 641 (9th Cir. 2012) (not reported). 
155 Bonneau, 666 F.3d at 577. 
156 Doe 150, 469 Fed. Appx. at 641. 
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extended, no delayed discovery rule) statute of limitations under ORS § 
12.110 and ORS § 12.160 disability tolling statute applies to the Oregon 
Tort Claims Act, which governs cases brought against municipalities. 157 
Finally, people sue where there are deep pockets. The Oregon Torts 
Claims Act protects governments, school districts and other institutions 
from the application of ORS § 12.117, and thus few cases are brought 
against them. Few cases can be brought under ORS § 12.117 against insured 
individuals because insurance does not cover intentional acts of child abuse. 
And the alternative cause of action, negligence, is much harder to prove 
than intentional child abuse, and so is less likely to be brought. This may 
leave few viable defendants. The Catholic Church, for example, has filed 
bankruptcy to avoid claims. 
It is unlikely, given the few cases brought under the liberal Oregon 
statute, that extending the statute of limitations for survivors of any child 
abuse will result in a "flood" of cases. And, if there is a genuine "flood" 
after such extension, it is the legislature's purview to address the problem-
not the judiciary's. 158 Finally, the legislature can address the issue in 
advance by indicating its intent in the statute. 
B. Child Abuse is too Hard to Define 
"Physical and emotional abuse is too difficult to define to give notice 
of actionable behavior and assist courts in drawing appropriate lines" is 
another argument against extending the limitations period for survivors of 
all child abuse. Courts also used the "too difficult to define argument" in 
the early sexual harassment cases until the concept was finally accepted and 
defined. Since courts and legislatures can define sexual harassment, they 
can defme child abuse. As discussed next, courts can define these concepts 
in many viable ways. 
1. Courts Could Adopt the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) Uniform Definitions 
The CDC considers child maltreatment a public health issue. Child 
maltreatment causes "physical, behavioral, social, and emotional harm and 
disability and is a risk factor for a range of other health risk factors that 
contribute to acute and chronic health problems." 159 Thus, the CDC collects 
157 VT., 20I5 WL 300270; Duncan, 2007 WL 789433. 
· 
158 Stem, supra note I 0 I, at 380. 
159 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Child Maltreatment Surveillance: Uniform Definitions for Public Health and 
Recommended Data Elements, Version 1.0 4 (2008), 
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data from state and federal agencies to determine the extent of child 
maltreatnient. 160 Unfortunately, the varied agencies and entities - state 
agencies, medical facilities and the legal community - that report statistics 
to the CDC use their own non-uniform definitions. This hampers efforts to 
identify the extent of the problem and a response to it. 161 
To solve this problem, the CDC gathered experts from universities, 
state and federal agencies, hospitals and research firms to draft uniform 
definitions of child maltreatment "to promote consistent terminology and 
data collection related to child maltreatment." 162 After three years of 
drafting, reviewing and revising, the National Center for Injury Prevention 
and Control ("NCIPC"), a part of the CDC, published Child Maltreatment 
Surveillance: Uniform Definitions for Public Health and Recommended 
Data Elements, Version 1.0. 163 The report defines child abuse generally. It 
also provides specific definitions for each individual form of child abuse. 
Therefore, the claimed difficult-to-define concepts of psychological 
and emotional abuse do have specific definitions. For example, the Uniform 
Definitions defines psychological abuse as "intentional caregiver behavior 
(i.e. act of commission) that conveys to a child that he/she is worthless, 
flawed, unloved, unwanted, endangered or valued only in meeting another's 
needs." 164 It includes "blaming, belittling, degrading, intimidating, 
terrorizing, isolating, [emphasis in original] restraining, confining, 
corrupting, exploiting, spurning, or otherwise behaving in a manner that is 
harmful, potentially harmful, or insensitive to the child's developmental 
needs, or can potentially damage the child psychologically or 
emotionally." 165 Finally, the definitions state that psychological abuse can 
be "chronic and pervasive" over time or "episodic," such as when triggered 
by an event such as caregiver substance abuse. 166 
The report further defines "terrorizing" and "isolating," which are 
terms used to define psychological abuse. "Terrorizing" includes: 
caregiver behavior that is life-threatening; makes a child feel 
unsafe (e.g., situations that are likely to physically hurt, kill, 
or abandon the child) ... ; sets unrealistic expectations of the 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cm_surveillance-a.pdf. 
160 !d. at 3. 
161 !d. 
162 !d. at iv. 
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child with threat of loss, harm, or danger if expectations are 
not met; and threatens or perpetrates violence against a child 
or a child's loved ones or objects (including toys, pets, or 
other possessions) ... For example, placing a child in 
unpredictable or chaotic circumstances would be considered 
terrorizing as would be placing a child in a situation 
reasonably considered dangerous by either the child or 
another adult. 167 
"Isolating" "occurs when a caregiver forbids, prevents, or minimizes 
a child's contact with others." 168 
Emotional neglect, another difficult-to-define abuse, is also defined. 
Emotional neglect results when the caregiver "ignores the child, or denies 
emotional responsiveness or adequate access to mental health care (e.g. 
caregiver does not respond to infant cries or older child's attempt to 
interact.)." 169 
The final difficult-to-define form of child abuse is abuse caused by 
omission. The report defines this as well. Exposing a child to violent 
environments and failing to "protect the child from pervasive violence 
within the home, neighborhood, or community" are all acts of omission that 
constitute child abuse. 170 Also included is exposing a child to intimate 
partner violence. 171 
Child abuse is definable. Legislatur~s can use these definitions to 
revise limitations statutes. In turn, courts would have specific statutory 
language to guide them in deciding cases. And potential defendants would 
know exactly what behavior was actionable. 
2. Courts Could Adopt Definitions From States that Allow Child Abuse 
Survivors the Use o(an Extended Statute o(Limitations and the Delayed 
Discovery Rule 
Florida and Oregon allow child abuse survivors to use an extended 
statute of limitations and the delayed discovery rule to bring tort claims for 
child abuse after reaching adulthood. 172 
167 !d. (citations omitted). 
168 !d. 
169 Id. at 17 (citation omitted). 
170 !d. 
171 Id. at 18. 
172 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 95.11(7) (2010); OR. REV. STAT.§ 12.117 (2013); IDAHO CODE 
ANN.§ 6-1704(1) (2010). 
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Florida allows adult survivors of child abuse to sue for "intentional 
torts based on abuse." 173 The statute cites to three code sections to define 
child abuse. 174 First, Florida Statute § 39.01 defines abuse for proceedings 
pertaining to children. Florida Statute § 415.102 defines abuse for adult 
protective services. And Florida Statute § 984.03 defines abuse for purposes 
of juvenile criminal actions. The language is similar in all three. For 
example, Florida Statute § 39.01 abuse is defined as 
any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, 
mental, or sexual abuse, injury, or harm that causes or is 
likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional 
health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes 
acts or omissions. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent 
or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself 
constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the 
child. 175 
Oregon takes a different approach. It defines child abuse within the 
extended statute of limitations statute. Child abuse is defined as 
intentional conduct by an adult that results in (A) Any 
physical injury to a child; or (B) Any mental injury to a child 
which results in observable and substantial impairment of 
the child's mental or psychological ability to function caused 
by cruelty to the child, with due regard to the culture of the 
child. 176 
Idaho also gives child abuse survivors an extended period to sue for 
assault, battery and negligence. 177 Unlike Florida and Oregon, the Idaho 
statute does not define child abuse. 
These definitions, or lack thereof, allow child abuse survivors in 
Florida, Idaho and Oregon to offer facts to qualify for the use of the 
extended statute of limitations and delayed discovery rule. They also leave 
the line drawing to judges, whose job it is to do just that. 
173 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (2010). 
174 !d. 
175 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.01(2). 
176 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(2) (2013). 
177 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6- I 704(1) (20 10). 
..... 
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3. Viable Options for Defining Di(ficult-to-Define Psychological Abuse 
and Emotional Neglect Exist 
Viable options for defining "difficult-to-define" psychological 
abuse and emotional neglect, the two forms of child abuse that are· most 
difficult to define, exist. A moment of "losing it" and calling your child a 
bad person should not be enough to prove emotional abuse. One option is 
to require plaintiffs demonstrate a persistent pattern of psychological abuse 
to use the limitations statute. For example, only evidence of repeated name 
calling, extensive neglect, or a persistent pattern of criticism, contempt, 
humiliation or neglect would be proof of emotional abuse. Extensive 
physical abuse should also establish emotional harm. 
Another option is to include a list of actionable behavior proven to 
cause emotional harm within the limitations statute. For example, there is 
research that indicates witnessing violence against siblings causes 
emotional harm. 178 Thus, the list might include emotional harm caused by 
repeatedly witnessing physical abuse or sadistic treatment of siblings. There 
is also research that demonstrates that witnessing intimate partner violence 
causes emotional harm. 179 Many states now impose stronger penalties for 
domestic abuse when children are present. 180 Thus, it is logical to include 
these actionable behaviors in the list as well. 
Finally, legislatures should include in the list repeatedly witnessing 
physical abuse of the family pet. Research indicates that child abuse and 
animal cruelty co-occur in violent homes. 181 Since family pets are just as 
powerless as a child, it is logical, therefore, to deduce that if witnessing 
repeated violence against a caregiver or sibling causes emotional harm, then 
178 See Martin H. Teicher & Gordana D. Vitaliano, Witnessing Violence Toward Siblings: 
An Understudied but Potent Form of Early Adversity, 6 PLoS ONE e28852 (20 II). 
179 See Steve Stride, Robert Geffner & Alan Lincoln, The Physiological and Traumatic 
Effects of Childhood Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence, 8 J. EMOT. ABUSE 83 (2008). 
180 When ex-49er Ray MacDonald was arrested for domestic violence against his 
girlfriend, he was also charged with child endangerment because he assaulted her while 
she was holding a child. California criminal code contains stronger penalties for intimate 
partner violence witnessed by children. See Henry K. Lee, Former 49ers Lineman Ray 
McDonald Arrested; Bears Let Him Go, S.F. CHRON. (May 25, 20I5), 
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/ article/ Former-49ers-lineman-Ray-McDonald-arrested-in-
6285I6I.php. 
181 See, e.g., Sarah DeGrue & David K. DiLillo, Is Animal Cruelty a "Red Flag" for 
Family Violence?: Investigating Co-Occurring Violence Toward Children, Partners, and 
Pets, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE I036 (2009); Clifton P. Flynn, Examining the links 
between animal abuse and human violence, 55 CRIME LAW Soc. CHANGE 453 (20II); C. 
A. Simmons & P. Lehmann, Exploring the Link Between Pet Abuse and Controlling 
Behaviors in Violent Relationships, 22 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE I2II-1222 (2007). 
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viewing physical abuse of the family pet also causes emotional harm. 
Clearly, viable options for defining the terms exist and are in use. In 
the past, courts and legislatures argued sexual harassment was "too-
difficult-to-define." They both turned away from defining such emotionally 
charged concepts. But plaintiffs rallied in the face of their cowardice. As a 
result, legislatures and courts did define actionable sexual harassment 
behavior. 182 Thus, they can also define child abuse. 
C. The Recovered Memory Controversy Will Reoccur 
Fear that the "recovered" memory controversy will reoccur is 
another argument against extending the limitations period for child abuse 
survivors. "Repressed memory theory" asserts that traumatic childhood 
experiences are frequently buried in the subconscious. 183 Thus, it states, it 
is common for survivors to have no memory of abuse until memories are · ,, 
"recovered" in therapy. 184 
Survivors used this theory, among other evidence, in lobbying 
legislatures to extend the statute of limitations. Specifically, they asked 
legislatures to codify the delayed discovery rule for use by survivors who 
"recovered" the memory of the abuse. 185 Legislatures complied. 186 In 
addition, many of these statutes also extended the limitations period for 
survivors who always remembered the abuse, but were unable to meet the 
statute of limitations because they were underage or did not understand the 
causal connection between the abuse they suffered and their current 
psychological symptoms. 187 
Subsequently, plaintiffs, who recently "recovered" memories of 
abuse in therapy, began to use the extended statute of limitations to sue for 
damages. These cases, "recovered memory" cases (labeled Type II by the 
courts), were more successful than the always-remembered-the-abuse cases 
(labeled Type 1). 188 This was because courts believed that if a survivor 
always remembered the abuse, it was reasonable to expect that she 
" ... disclose the offense against her, connect her injuries with their cause, 
182 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, YALE L.J. 1683, 1690 (1998). 
183 See generally ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED 
MEMORY (1994). 
184 !d. 
185 See Wilson, supra note 1. 
186 !d. at 147, 154-55. 
187 !d. at 149. 
188 See Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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and file a suit within the timeframe of the standard statute oflimitations."189 
As a result, many more Type II cases were brought than Type I cases. 190 
And these cases were successful even though the plaintiff, with the help of 
a therapist, recently "recovered" the abuse memory in therapy. 191 
After some individuals were wrongly accused of sex abuse, the 
"recovered" memory and the techniques used for "recovery" came under 
scrutiny. 192 Thereafter, research revealed that memories could be distorted 
or implanted by well-meaning professionals using suggestive techniques for 
"recovering" memory because memory is a reconstructive process. 193 It also 
established that there is no evidence that traumatic experiences, such as sex 
abuse, are frequently repressed, only to be recalled decades later. 194 It states 
that repression can occur, but only in a small number of cases. 195 
This research ended the success of Type II "recovered memory" 
cases. Now they are the exception rather than the norm. 196 Current cases are 
of the Type I category, always-remembered-the-abuse cases. 197 Thus, it is 
highly unlikely that an extension of the statute oflimitations and the delayed 
discovery rule to survivors of any child abuse would cause a resurgence in 
a largely discredited theory. 
189 Wilson,supranote 1,at 171-91 & 176. 
190 !d. 
-191 !d. 
192 See id. at 183. See also Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Repressed Memory Controversy, 49 
AM. PSYCHOL. 443 (1994); Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 
AM. PSYCHOL. 518 (1993). 
193 ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHUM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY 
(1994). 
194 !d. at 214-15, 218-19. 
195 See Diana M. Elliott, Traumatic Events: Prevalence and Delayed Recall in the General 
Population, 65 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 811, 814 (1997) (finding 20% of the 
child sexual abuse victims surveyed experienced a "history of complete memory loss," 
with another 22% reporting a "history of partial memory loss"); Shirley Feldman-Summers 
& Kenneth S. Pope, The Experience of "Forgetting" Childhood Abuse: A National Survey 
of Psychologists, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 636, 637 (1994) (conducting a 
survey of psychotherapists which found that 44.4% of victims experienced either partial or 
total forgetting); Elizabeth F. Loftus et a!., Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: 
Remembering and Repressing, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 67, 78 (1994) (finding that 19% 
of the women with child sexual abuse histories in an outpatient clinic for substance abuse 
reported a period of total amnesia for the abuse). 
196 See Wilson, supra note 1, at 149. 
197 !d. 
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IV. Why Extension of the Statute of Limitations for Survivors of all 
Forms of Child Abuse is Necessary 
Extension of the limitations period to survivors of all child abuse is 
necessary. First, society has developed an increased awareness and 
understanding of the effects of child abuse. Thus, the current extended 
limitations period, applicable to sex abuse survivors only, is inconsistent 
with this shift. Second, child abuse impairs survival skills. This results in 
tremendous societal economic costs if the harm is not addressed. Finally, 
child abuse causes long-term damage that is often hidden until adulthood. 
Our current legal structures are inadequate to address it. 
A. The Limitations Period Applicable Only to Sex Abuse Survivors is 
Inconsistent with the Shift in Society's Awareness and Understanding of 
the Damaging Effects of Childhood Maltreatment . ~' 
In the last 25 years, society's awareness and understanding of the .~ 
effects of childhood maltreatment has increased. This began with 
international recognition and adoption of a child's right to be free of 
oppression and violence. The shift was strengthened by research that 
revealed the ineffectiveness of ending child abuse by intervening after it 
occurs, as well as research that documented the reality and extent of 
worldwide violence against children. Finally, evidence of the shift is 
reflected in recent legislation acknowledges that domestic violence 
committed in a child's presence is child abuse and in public reaction to 
recent arrests of professional athletes for child abuse and domestic violence 
committed in the presence of a child. 
1. International Recognition that Children Have a Right to be Free of 
Oppression and Violence Began the Shift toward a New Understanding of 
the Effects of Child Abuse 
International recognition of a child's right to be free of oppression 
and violence first occurred in 1990. One hundred and forty nations signed 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights ofthe Child. 198 This document 
acknowledges and enforces the rights of children to be free of violence and 
oppression. 199 
International awareness and discussion has continued since then. In 
2008, Stanford Law Professor Michael Wald, a leading authority on legal 
198 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
199 !d. 
178 UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy Vol. 20:2 
policy toward children, advised international experts that the goal of child 
protection should be the well-being of the child rather than short-term 
protection from harm. 200 In 2009, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
the committee that oversees worldwide implementation of the United 
Nations Treaty on the Rights of the Child, issued a General Comment to the 
Treaty which called for a worldwide child's rights orientation to child 
protection. 201 
2. Research Demonstrating the Ineffectiveness o(the Reactive Approach 
to Child Protection and Revealing Worldwide Violence Against Children 
Contributed to the Shift 
Research contributed to the shift as well. Research demonstrates that 
the reactive nature of child protection is ineffective in ending child abuse. 202 
In 2006, The Report of United Nations Secretary General's Study on 
Violence against Children documented the reality of worldwide violence 
against children. 203 The report detailed the nature, extent and causes of 
violence against children. It also proposed recommendations to prevent and 
respond to it. 204 
3. Evidence o(the Shift Can Be Found in Legislation and Public Outcry 
The child's rights understanding and adoption can be observed in 
legislation and public reaction as well. Twenty-three states in the last 20 
years have enacted legislation that acknowledges that domestic violence 
committed in the presence of children is detrimental to a child's mental 
health and development. Eight states treat such an event as an "aggravating 
circumstance" for sentencing. 205 Eight states treat it with more severe 
200 Stuart N. Hart & Danya Glaser, Psychological maltreatment- Maltreatment of the 
mind: A catalyst for advancing child protection toward proactive primary prevention and 
promotion of personal well-being, 35 CHILD ABUSE NEGL. 758 (2011). 
201 !d. at 760. The Comments guide nation members in fulfilling their treaty obligations. 
202 !d. at 758-66. 
203 Paolo Sergio Pinheiro, Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations Study 
on Violence Against Children, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
A/611299 (Aug. 29, 2006). 
204 See id. at 25-33. 
205 ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(18)(C) (2015) (originally enacted 2012); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT.§ 13-702(C), § 13-701(0)(18) (2014) (originally enacted 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1170.76 (2006) (originally enacted 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.4 (2016) 
(originally enacted 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7(3), (4) (2016) (originally enacted 
2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(3)(a)(v) (2015) (originally enacted 2001); OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2929.12(B)(9) (2015) (originally enacted 2014); WASH. REv. CODE § 
9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) (2015) (originally enacted 2007). 
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penalties. 206 Five states treat it as a separate crime that may be charged 
separately and in addition to the act. 207 Nevada gives the court the discretion 
to refer a child who has witnessed a battery that constitutes domestic 
violence to the child .welfare services agency and require the defendant to 
reimburse the agency for the costs of any services provided. 208 V enpont 
gives the court discretion when imposing a sentence for domestic assault to 
consider whether the offense was committed within the presence of a 
child. 209 
Although New Jersey has no legislation governing domestic 
violence committed in the presence of a child, the State recognizes the 
detrimental effects of violence witnessed by children. Assault of another at 
a school or community sponsored youth sports event in the presence of a 
child under 16 years of age is assault in the fourth degree and subject to 
harsher penalties than simple assault. 210 •. , 
Finally, the public sphere has become invested in protecting · 
children's well-being when confronted by abuse. This was illustrated by the · 
extensive media coverage and commentary after Minnesota Vikings Adrian 
Peterson was arrested for felony child abuse for beating his 4-year-old son 
with a tree branch in September 2014211 and after Chicago Bear Ray 
206 ARK. CODE ANN.§ 5-4-702 (2015) (originally enacted 2001); FLA. STAT.§ 921.0024 
(2016) (originally enacted 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-918(4) (2016) (originally 
enacted 2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2 (2016) (originally enacted 2001); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2) (2015) (originally enacted 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:37.7(D) (2016) (originally enacted 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-601.1 
(2016); OR. REV. STAT.§ 163.160(3)(a) (2016) (originally enacted 2010). 
207 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11 02(a)(4)(2016)(originally enacted 1998); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-5-70(d) (2016) (originally enacted 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(d) (2016) 
(originally enacted 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 644(G)-(H) (20 16) (originally enacted 
1999); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5-109.1 (2016) (originally enacted 1997). 
208 NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.485(7) (2015) (originally enacted 2007). 
209 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1047 (2016)(originally enacted 2007). 
210 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:12-l(f) states in pertinent part that "[a] person who commits a 
simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subsection a. ofthis section in the 
presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or community sponsored youth sports 
event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. The defendant shall be strictly liable upon 
proof that the offense occurred, in fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age. It 
shall not be a defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or 
reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older." 
211 See, e.g., Steve Eder & Pat Borzi, NFL. Rocked Again as Adrian Peterson Faces a 
Child Abuse Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), 
http://www. nytimes.com/20 14/09/ 13/sports /football/adrian-peterson-indicted-on-child-
injury-charge.html? _r=O (last visited June 10, 20 15). "Peterson beat his 4-year-old son with 
a tree branch ... causing cuts and bruises in several areas of the boy's body, including his 
180 UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy Vol. 20:2 
MacDonald was arrested for misdemeanor domestic violence and child 
endangerment for assaulting his girlfriend while she was holding an infant 
in August 2015. 212 
Given the above, statutes of limitations allowing sexual abuse 
survivors extended time to bring claims against their perpetrators and not 
allowing the same for survivors of other forms of child abuse do not reflect 
the legal and societal shift that has occurred and is still ongoing. They are 
inconsistent with society's developed awareness and understanding of the 
effects of child abuse and should be changed to reflect this shift. 213 
B. Child Abuse Harm Causes Significant Detrimental Economic 
Consequences to the Individual and Society 
Child abuse harm causes significant detrimental economic 
consequences to the individual and society. Psychological issues impede 
education completion and diminish job opportunities. They can also make 
it difficult for survivors to stay employed. Society also bears the cost of 
child abuse harm. These costs are likely much higher than estimates since 
they are based on documented reports only. Even so, conservative estimates 
of these costs rival the costs of other major societal health problems. 
1. Child Abuse Survivors Receive Less Education, Have Fewer Job 
Opportunities and Often Have Difficulty Staying Employed 
Child abuse survivors often suffer throughout their lives from 
mental and psychological health problems. These issues interfere with 
learning. 214 They impair survival skills. 215 Some drop out of high school, 216 
back, ankles and legs. Peterson told the police that the punishment was a 'whooping' 
administered after the boy pushed another of Peterson's children." !d. 
212 See, e.g., Ken Belson, Bears Release Ex-49er Ray McDonald After Arrest in 
California, N.Y.TIMES (May 25, 2015), 
http://www. nytimes.corn/20 15/0 5/26/ sports/footballlbears-release-ra y-mcdonald -after-
arrest-in-cal i fomia.html. 
213 !d. 
214 Anda, supra note 6, at 30. 
215 J. P. Shonkoff et al., The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic 
Stress, 129 PEDIATRICS e232-e246 (2012); Xiangming Fang et al., The economic burden 
of child maltreatment in the United States and implications for prevention, 36 CHILD 
ABUSE NEGL. 156, 158 (2012); Hart & Glaser, supra note 200, at 758-66. 
216 Ruth Gilbert et al., Burden and consequences of child maltreatment in high-income 
countries, 373 THE LANCET 68, 74 (2009); J. Currie & C. Spatz Widom, Long-Term 
Consequences of Child Abuse and Nelect on Adult Economic Well-Being, 15 CHILD 
MALTREAT. 111, 114 (2010). 
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while others finish, but never go to college. 217 With less education, 
survivors have fewer job opportunities than they would otherwise. 218 Thus, 
many of the jobs available to them are low paying. 219 In 2010, survivors of 
child abuse earned $5,890 less per year on average than individuals in a 
control group of non-abused individuals. 220 Survivors also often have 
trouble staying employed. 221 Survivors with psychological issues, such as 
post-traumatic stress syndrome, can overreact to stimulus. 222 This can result 
in inappropriate behavior leading to termination. 223 
2. Research Shows, and Underestimates, the Average Lifetime Cost o( 
Child Abuse 
The costs of child abuse include childhood healthcare costs, adult 
medical costs, productivity losses, child welfare costs, criminal justice costs 
and special education costs. 224 To calculate the total costs incurred between ., 
the ages 6 and 64, researchers studied 579,000 individuals for whom child 
protective services had intervened. 225 They found that the average lifetime 
cost of non-fatal child abuse, in 2010 dollars, was $210,012 per person. 226 
This figure likely underestimates the actual lifetime costs. 227 Cases 
reported to Child Protective Services likely represent only a fraction of the 
total incidents of child abuse that occur each_ year. 228 Thus, since the 
research used only substantiated cases reported to Child Protective Services, 
it is likely that the correct figure is substantially higher. 
217 /d. 
218 Currie et al., supra note 216, at 120; David S. Zielinski, Long-Term Socioeconomic 
Impact of Child Abuse and Neglect: Implications for Public Policy. Policy Matters., CENT. 
CHILD FAM. POLICY DUKE UNIV. NJl (2005), http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED492018 (last 
visited Jun 17, 20 15); David S. Zielinski, Child maltreatment and adult socioeconomic 
well-being, 33 CHILD ABUSE NEGL. 666, 674 (2009) [hereinafter Child Maltreatment]. 
219 Currie et al., supra note 216, at 117; Zielinski, supra note 218, at 3. 
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3. The Cost o(Child Abuse Harm is Comparable to the Cost o(Other 
Serious Social Health Problems 
It is helpful to compare the cost society pays for child abuse to the 
cost of other serious social health problems to understand its impact. Below 
is a chart that compares the average lifetime cost of child abuse with the 
average lifetime cost of stroke and type II diabetes per person in 2010 
dollars. 
Table 6. Average Lifetime Cost of Per Person of Stroke, Child Abuse 
and Type II Diabetes in 2010 Dollars Compared 
Major Societal Health Problem 
Lifetime Cost Per Person in 2010 
Dollars 
Stroke $159,846 
Child Abuse $210,012 
Type II Diabetes $181,000 to $253,000 
The average lifetime cost of child abuse is $210,012 per person. 229 
The average lifetime cost of a stroke survivor is $150,846. 230 Thus, child 
abuse costs society $59,166 or 39% more per person than stroke. The 
average lifetime cost oftype II diabetes is between $181,000 and $253,000 
per person. 231 Thus, child abuse costs society between $29,012 more and 
$42,988 less per person than type II diabetes. Thus, child abuse harm costs 
surpass the lifetime costs of other s~rious societal health problems. 232 
Table 7. Additional average lifetime costs per person in 2010 dollars of 
child abuse than stroke and type II diabetes 
Average Lifetime 
Additional Cost Per 
Person for Child 
Cost Per Person 
Abuse 
Stroke $150,846 $59,166 
Type II Diabetes $181,000 $29,012 
The untreated long-term effects of child abuse continue into 
adulthood. The resulting psychological harm inhibits the ability to self-
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regulate emotions and behavior. 233 Without this ability, staying employed 
can be difficult. Survivors of child abuse are twice as likely as their non-
abused peers to fall below the federal poverty line as adults. 234 They are 
twice as likely as their non-abused peers to have their family income fall 
into the lowest quartile of income distribution. 235 They also have a higher 
risk of poverty and unemployment because they have less education. 236 
Society pays too. Survivors are more likely to need welfare, 
disability and unemployment benefits. Some find themselves in prison. 
Extending the statute of limitations to survivors of all child abuse would 
allow some to seek redress and improve their quality of life. 
C. Current Legal Structures are Inadequate to Address the Harm 
The current legal structures are inadequate to address the societal 
and individual harm child abuse causes. Child Protective Services , 
"protects" only a small number of children abused.237 Its reactive approach, 
intervening only after abuse has occurred, does not prevent the damage from 
occurring. 238 
The current extended limitations legislation sends the message that 
survivors of non-sexual forms of child abuse have not suffered enough to 
be worthy of the rights afforded survivors of childhood sex abuse. It also 
encourages those seeking recovery for co-occurring abuse to describe it all 
as "just sex abuse" and allows sex abuse survivors to recover for non-sexual 
abuse harm otherwise not actionable. In enacting it, legislatures avoided the 
responsibility of redressing the harm caused by co-occurring forms of 
abuse. 
Intentional tort and negligence are also inadequate. These theories 
require that harm caused by co-occurring forms of child abuse be 
apportioned. But, since child abuse forms co-occur, segregating the harm 
caused among these theories is not possible. 239 Doing so may result in under 
or over recovery. 
Finally, the shortened limitations period applicable to non-sexual 
abuse does not allow survivors enough time to discover the damage and 
233 Shonkoff et al., supra note 215. 
234 Zielinski, supra note 218, at 674. 
235 !d. 
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238 !d. at 759, 762. 
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seek redress. Child abuse damages the developing brain of the child. The 
effects of this damage appear later in life in increased risk of unhealthy 
behavior, re-victimization, violence and premature mortality. Counseling 
and educational support can diminish the long-term effects of this 
damage, 240 but without resources many will not seek treatment staying in a 
cycle of self-destruction and financial insecurity. 241 An extended statute of 
limitations would allow these survivors time to realize the damage, se~k 
redress and get treatment. 
1. The Reactive Approach to Child Abuse is Ineffective 
The reactive approach to child abuse, intervention after it occurs, is 
ineffective. 242 First, Child Protective Services intervene to protect a child 
after child abuse has occurred. 243 Second, they are restricted by a narrow 
definition of child abuse. 244 This allows them to intervene only in extreme 
cases. Consequently, they address only 25% of the child abuse that occurs 
yearly. 245 The discrepancy between Child Protective Services interventions 
reported and retrospective reporting studies demonstrates this. 246 
2. Legislators Are Unwilling to Invest in Prevention 
Prevention is the best way to end child abuse. 247 Prevention entails 
spending money for years before seeing the benefits, requiring foresight and 
delayed gratification. 248 Prevention legislation does not help legislators get 
elected since it may be years until they can point to results. Until the 
legislature makes a commitment to prevention legislation, adult abuse 
survivors will continue to bear the costs of living with the harm caused by 
child abuse. 249 
240 MMW, supra note 6, at 1613; see Dube eta!., supra note 6, at 729. "Psychological 
treatment that can mitigate the progression of ACE-related health problems, such as 
trauma-focused cognitive-behavioral therapy, are effective and should be widely 
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3. Legislators Have Singled Out Sex Abuse as Worthy o(Redress and 
Non-Sexua1 Abuse as Not "Bad Enough" to Warrant the Same Treatment 
Avoiding the Responsibility o(Redressing the Harm Caused by Co-
Occurring Forms o(Abuse 
Legislatures and judges have singled out sex abuse as intolerable, 
and thus have granted its survivors an extended statute of limitations. This 
sex/non-sex split is not new in legal jurisprudence. Professor Vicki Schultz 
noted that "[s]ingling out sexual advances as the essence of workplace 
harassment has allowed courts to feel enlightened about protecting women 
from sexual violation, while at the same time relieving judges of the 
responsibility to redress other, broader gender-based problems in the 
workplace." 250 
The same is true in this situation. Legislators and judges, in ignoring 
the rights of survivors of non-sexual abuse, demonstrate their belief that J.· 
other forms of abuse are "just not that bad" or not "as bad" as sex abuse .. , 
Current legislation sends the message that survivors of non-sexual forms of 
child abuse have not suffered enough to be worthy of the rights afforded 
survivors of childhood sex abuse. In enacting it, legislatures avoided the 
responsibility of redressing the harm caused by co-occurring forms of 
abuse. 
4. The Extended Limitations Period {Or Sex Abuse Survivors Encourages 
Individuals to Describe All Abuse Suffered as "Sex Abuse" and Allows 
Sex Abuse Survivors to Recover {Or Non-Sex Abuse Harm that is 
Otherwise Not Actionable 
As stated above, child abuse survivors often experience more than 
one form of abuse. For example, secondary emotional abuse often co-occurs 
with sex abuse. 251 A sexually abused child feels inferior, vulnerable and 
undeserving of good treatment. 252 Other forms of child abuse co-occur with 
sex abuse as well. 253 Thus, most "sex abuse" survivors experienced many 
forms of child abuse. But the extended limitations period is only for sex 
abuse survivors. Thus, it encourages those seeking recovery for co-
occurring abuse to describe it all as "just sex abuse." 
250 Schultz, supra note 182, at 1690. 
251 See generally Dong eta!., supra note 43; Edwards eta!., supra note 92; Anda, supra 
note 99, at 8; Hart, supra note 200, at 760-62. 
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Thus, the "sex abuse" survivor likely experienced many forms of 
abuse. And she can recover damages for those other forms because she 
suffered sex abuse. Yet, had she not, she could not recover for the co-
occurring forms of child abuse she suffered. For example, a sex abuse 
survivor may recover for the harm caused by the sex abuse, while also being 
compensated for secondary emotional abuse, physical abuse, neglect, or 
direct emotional abuse she experienced. Thus, sex abuse survivors are 
recovering for harm caused by non-sexual forms· of abuse otherwise not 
recoverable. 
5. Harm from Co-Occurring Forms o[Child Abuse is Not Divisible 
Among Tort Claims and Thus May Result in Under or Over Recovery 
Previous studies on harm caused by individual types of child abuse 
attributed the harm discovered to that one form of abuse. 254 In reality, 
however, the harm discovered was most likely caused by co-occurring types 
of abuse. 255 This is because the ACE study proved that the long-term effects 
of child abuse are likely due to co-occurring forms of abuse. 256 Thus, 
previous studies of individual child abuse forms are now considered 
inaccurate257 and illogical. 258 
Thus, co-occurring forms of child abuse cause harm that cannot be 
segregated between intentional tort and negligence theories. For example, a 
survivor of sex abuse and extreme neglect may sue for battery for the former 
and negligence for the latter. The jury must then segregate the sex abuse 
harm from the neglect harm to award damages. The ACE study proved there 
was no accurate way to do this. Furthermore, doing so was illogical. Thus, 
dividing harm may result in under or over recovery because it does not 
account for the co-occurrence of abuse. 
A cause of action for child abuse would account for the co-
occurrence of child abuse and its adverse effects. It would end the need for 
sex abuse survivors to characterize all the abuse suffered as sex abuse. It 
would allow survivors of all child abuse forms to recover. It would end 
segregation of harm caused among causes of action and the resulting under 
or over recovery. Finally, it would reflect a more accurate understanding of 
child abuse and the harm it causes. 
It appears that such a cause of action might be possible in the future. 
254 Dong eta!., supra note 43, at 772; Edwards eta!., supra note 92, at 1459. 
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Legislatures and courts seem to be evolving toward a broader understanding 
of workplace harassment. Healthy workplace legislation protects workers 
from abuse in the work place. 259 This includes verbal abuse, threatening, 
humiliating or intimidating conduct and work interference. 260 Healthy 
workplace legislation has been introduced in 29 states, 261 including 
Tennessee and California. 262 The California law states that "abusive 
conduct" "may include repeated infliction of verbal abuse, such as the use 
of derogatory remarks, insults, and epithets, verbal or physical conduct that 
a reasonable person would find threatening, intimidating, or humiliating, or 
the gratuitous sabotage or undermining of a person's work performance. "263 
The trend toward protecting adults from abuse at work is laudable. 
Yet, an adult abused at work is not as vulnerable as a child abused at home. 
Additionally, unlike a child, an adult has options to change her situation. 
Child abuse, because of the vulnerability and powerlessness of the child; · 
causes lifetime damage. If the law acknowledges that adults need a cause of' 
action for protection, surely it is time to acknowledge the same for child 
abuse survivors. Until then, an extension of the limitations period to 
survivors of all forms of child abuse to sue using tort causes of action must 
suffice. 
6. The Shortened Limitations Period Applicable to Non-Sexual Abuse 
Does Not Allow Survivors Enough Time to Seek Redress [or the Long-term 
Deleterious Effects o( Child Abuse that Appear Later in Life 
Child abuse in all forms causes permanent alterations in the brain's 
stress response systems. 264 Studies show child abuse reduces the corpus 
259 See States, Healthy Workplace Bill (2016), http://healthyworkp1acebill.org/states/; see 
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callosum size, 265 arrests the development of the prefrontal cortex 
(responsible for moderating social behavior and decision making), 266 and 
damages the hippocampus (which regulates stress and anxiety). 267 These 
alterations increase the risk of unhealthy behaviors, re-victimization, 
violence and premature mortality. 268 The damage to the brain in childhood 
impairs the survivor's ability to function as an adult. 269 Thus, long-term 
effects of child abuse appear well after their cause. 270 
Counseling and educational support can diminish the long-term 
effects of this damage. 271 Yet, the law, with limited exceptions, only allows 
sex abuse survivors to pursue recovery to pay for such support. 272 Survivors 
of all forms of child abuse need an extended limitations period to realize the 
damage done and seek redress. Without this recovery, survivors of non-
sexual child abuse must use their own economic resources to get the support 
they need. Many will not seek treatment because of limited funds. 273 As a 
result, they will remain in a cycle of self-destructive behavior and financial 
insecurity. 274 Extending the limitations period for survivors of all child 
abuse would allow survivors the time they need to discover the damage, 
seek redress and get the treatment they need. 
Conclusion 
Child abuse impairs the health and socioeconomic well-being of its 
survivors. It also detrimentally affects public resources, such as 
unemployment and welfare benefits, workforce production, the health care 
system, and the global economy. 
Only four states allow adult survivors of non-sexual child abuse an 
extended limitations period to seek redress. This disparity is partly due to 
the pressure adult sexual abuse survivors applied to legislatures. It is also 
Behavioral and biological consequences, 13 DEV. PSYCHOPATHOL. 473--489 (2001); 
Shonkoff et a!., supra note 215, at 246. 
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due to society's belief that sexual abuse causes more harm and is more 
prevalent than other forms of child abuse. 
These beliefs reflect an ignorance of the nature of child abuse and 
the damage it causes. The ACE study demonstrated that sex abuse is not the 
most prevalent form of abuse and that different forms of child abuse co-
occur. This makes it impossible to attribute all the harm discovered to one 
particular form of child abuse. 
Extending the limitations period for all child abuse claims will not 
strain the courts nor will it re-ignite the recovered memory controversy. 
Oregon extended the limitations period for survivors of non-sexual forms 
of child abuse 26 years ago. No flood resulted. Concerns about recovered 
memory are also unwarranted. In fact, memory research has made such 
cases the exception rather than the norm. 
Worries about defining child abuse are also unfounded. Legislature~ 
and courts have grappled with defining difficult concepts before and thus 
are capable of defining child abuse. There are ample definitions 
promulgated by the CDC that can be used to craft clear legislation. 
Current legal structures are inadequate to address the harm. Child 
Protective Services intervenes only after extreme abuse occurs. The current 
legislation also inadvertently allows sex abuse survivors to recover for the 
secondary emotional abuse and other abuse that co-occurs with sexual 
abuse. Thus, until society is willing to provide survivors with the support 
needed to fully participate in society, they should at least be allowed to 
pursue recompense through the legal system. Allowing survivors of non-
sexual child abuse the same limitation rights currently awarded sexual abuse 
survivors will rectify an enormous unfairness in the law and convey the 
message that all forms of child abuse are equally unacceptable. 
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